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THE DIMENSIONS OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 
Charles Gardner Geyh∗ 
Abstract 
Scholars have traditionally analyzed judicial impartiality piecemeal, 
in disconnected debates on discrete topics. As a consequence, current 
understandings of judicial impartiality are balkanized and muddled. 
This Article seeks to reconceptualize judicial impartiality 
comprehensively, across contexts. In an era when “we are all legal 
realists now,” perfect impartiality—the complete absence of bias or 
prejudice—is at most an ideal; “impartial enough” has, of necessity, 
become the realistic goal. Understanding when imperfectly impartial is 
nonetheless impartial enough is aided by conceptualizing judicial 
impartiality in three distinct dimensions: a procedural dimension, in 
which impartiality affords parties a fair hearing; a political dimension, 
in which impartiality promotes public confidence in the courts; and an 
ethical dimension, in which impartiality is a standard of good conduct 
core to a judge’s self-definition. The seeming contradictions that cut 
across contexts in which judicial impartiality problems arise can, for the 
most part, be explained with reference to the dimensions those problems 
inhabit and the constraints to which regulation in those dimensions are 
subject. Thus, what is impartial enough to assure parties a fair hearing 
in the procedural dimension may or may not be impartial enough to 
satisfy the public in the political dimension, which may or may not be 
impartial enough to ensure that judges are behaving honorably in the 
ethical dimension. Analyzing partiality problems through the lens of the 
dimensions they occupy not only resolves many of the imponderables 
that have long plagued the subject, but also reveals a distinct trend—
impartiality is being transformed, from a value traditionally regulated 
largely by judges and the legal establishment in the procedural and 
ethical dimensions, to one that is increasingly the province of the 
political dimension, where it is regulated by the public and its elected 
representatives. By situating impartiality at the crossroads of judicial 
procedure, ethics, and politics, this Article offers a new perspective, not 
just on judicial impartiality, but also on the role of the American 
judiciary in the administration of justice and the political process.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“Judicial impartiality” is a feel-good term, like “puppies” and “pie,” 
that no decent soul would denigrate. Like “judicial independence,” 
judicial impartiality is ubiquitous. It is used and abused in myriad ways: 
to make legal arguments, score political points, exhort judges, and 
reassure the public. Unlike judicial independence, however—which has 
been exhaustively analyzed, theorized, canonized, and eulogized in 
books, edited volumes, reports, academic conferences, and articles—
judicial impartiality has received no systematic attention. There have 
been targeted efforts to evaluate when a judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned for purposes of judicial disqualification;1 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s 
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when the need for judicial impartiality justifies various ethics 
restrictions on judicial speech, association, and conduct;2 and when 
adjudicators run afoul of the Due Process Clause for being actually, 
probably, or apparently partial.3 Missing from the literature is any 
sustained effort to conceptualize impartiality broadly in relation to its 
multiplicity of applications. 
As a consequence of being undertheorized and haphazardly 
analyzed, judicial impartiality has stumbled its way into a series of 
holes, imponderables, and seeming contradictions: 
• In 1974, author Lillian Hellman wrote that “[n]obody outside of a 
baby carriage or a Judge’s chamber can believe in an unprejudiced point 
of view.”4 As jaded as she may have meant to sound nearly four 
decades ago, in a skeptical age when social science research has 
debunked the notion that judges entertain an “unprejudiced point of 
view,” the distinction she drew between judges and the general 
population seems almost naïve. Is the realm of the impartial now 
peopled only with infants—is judicial impartiality a fiction, or worse, a 
scam? 
• Vaughn Walker, a gay district court judge, invalidated California’s 
Proposition 8, which outlawed same-sex marriage.5 Under the federal 
disqualification statute, Judge Walker’s sexual orientation did not 
furnish a reasonable basis to question his impartiality.6 On the other 
hand, if Judge Walker owned a single share of stock in a corporation 
that intervened to defend Proposition 8, he would have had to disqualify 
himself immediately.7 Is it more likely that Judge Walker’s nominal 
shareholding would incline him to uphold Proposition 8, than that a 
lifetime of discrimination as a gay man would incline him to invalidate 
it?  
 
                                                                                                                     
Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2000); Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification—and a Stronger 
Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive 
Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733 (2011). 
 2. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: What are 
the Alternatives?, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1327 (2008); Developments in the Law: Voting and 
Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127 (2006).  
 3. See, e.g., Penny J. White, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 120 
(2009). 
 4. Lillian Hellman, Love Letters, Some Not So Loving, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1974, 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/00/09/10/specials/west-ray.html. 
 5. Lisa Leff, U.S. Court Rules Recusal of Gay Judge Not Necessary: Legal Battle on 
California’s Prop 8 Continues, HOUS. CHRON., June 15, 2011, at A5. 
 6. See id. 
 7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(b)(4), (d)(4) (2006) (requiring disqualification when a judge “has a 
financial interest in . . . a party to the proceeding,” and defining “financial interest” as 
“ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small”). 
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• In 2002, the U.S. Senate blocked President George W. Bush’s 
nomination of District Judge Charles Pickering to the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals on the grounds that his ideologically conservative 
views fueled doubts among interest groups and Senate Democrats that 
he would impartially uphold the law;8 and yet, upon returning to his 
duties as a district court judge, it would have been frivolous for parties 
to seek Judge Pickering’s disqualification on the grounds that his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.9 Why the double standard?  
• Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct included an ethics rule that 
forbade judicial candidates from announcing their views on issues that 
they would likely decide as judges—a rule the state defended as 
necessary to preserve judicial impartiality.10 Justice Antonin Scalia, 
writing for the Supreme Court in 2002, emphatically rejected the view 
that impartiality meant a “lack of preconception in favor of or against a 
particular legal view,” on his way to invalidating the rule on First 
Amendment grounds.11 Yet sixteen years earlier, then-nominee Judge 
Scalia refused to announce his legal views to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, explaining: 
[T]he only way to be sure that I am not impairing my 
ability to be impartial, and to be regarded as impartial in 
future cases before the Court, is simply to respectfully 
decline to give an opinion on whether any of the existing 
law on the Supreme Court is right, or wrong.12 
Was Justice Scalia being duplicitous, or was something else going on?  
• In the seventeenth century, Sir Matthew Hale devised a code of 
judicial conduct for his own use, which included a rule stating: “That I 
never engage myself in the beginning of any cause, but reserve myself 
unprejudiced till the whole be heard.”13 More recently, however, the 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See Darryl Fears, Nominee’s Past Opens Old Wounds; Appeals Court Pick Raises 
Tempers, Divides Blacks, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2002, at A5 (discussing opposition to Judge 
Pickering in terms of his ideology compromising his impartiality); Charles Hurt, Senators Send 
a Signal, Reject Judicial Pick in Voting down a Conservative Judge for an Appeals Court Seat, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 15, 2002, at A2 (reporting on Senate Judiciary Committee rejection of 
Judge Pickering). 
 9. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF 
JUDGES § 10.7 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that there is a “strong presumption against disqualifying a 
judge” solely on the basis of the judge’s judicial philosophy or views on matters of public 
policy).  
 10. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768–75 (2002). 
 11. Id. at 777–78. 
 12. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 58 (1986) 
(statement of Antonin Scalia, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit). 
 13. 2 LORD CAMPBELL,  THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 208 (1881). 
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U.S. Supreme Court has directed judges not to postpone judgment, 
given the expense of discovery, but to dismiss complaints at the 
beginning of any cause that judges deem “implausible” in light of their 
“common sense” and “experience.”14 Is impartiality becoming 
expendable? 
In Part I, I seek to isolate persistent problems with judicial partiality 
as they have been described and discussed in popular culture, to the end 
of illustrating the various ways in which judicial impartiality has been 
conceptualized. The goal is to define impartiality and its converse in 
functional rather than legal terms: partiality is as partiality does. Over 
time, authors of novels, poems, disquisitions, and polemics have 
identified a sprawling array of behaviors as antithetical to judicial 
impartiality. A synthesis of these illustrations yields a typology that 
helps to delineate the scope of judicial partiality as it has traditionally 
been understood.  
A critical insight in Part I is that traditional understandings of 
judicial impartiality do not include the naïve assumption that judges are 
devoid of bias. Judges have long been characterized as human beings 
subject to human prejudices—a characterization that has gained 
currency in the aftermath of the legal realism movement. If perfect 
impartiality is unattainable, the more pragmatic objective is to ensure 
that judges are “impartial enough” to fulfill the role assigned them 
under state and federal constitutions: to uphold the rule of law. How 
impartial is impartial enough to preserve the rule of law, however, 
depends on who one asks and why they care. 
In Part II, I argue that there are three beneficiaries of an impartial 
judiciary, each with different interests, who occupy three distinct 
dimensions of judicial impartiality: (1) parties to ligation, who seek a 
fair hearing from an impartial judge, in a “procedural dimension” of 
impartiality; (2) the public, for whom the institutional legitimacy of the 
judiciary depends on the impartiality of its judges, in a “political 
dimension” of impartiality; and (3) judges themselves, who take an oath 
to be impartial and for whom impartiality is a standard of conduct that is 
core to their self-definition, in an “ethical dimension” of impartiality.  
In Part III, I describe the different mechanisms for managing 
impartiality in the procedural, ethical, and political dimensions, to the 
end of reconceptualizing how impartiality is regulated. The differing 
objectives of each dimension, and the varying constraints under which 
each dimension operates, yield perspectives unique to each dimension 
on how judicial partiality problems should be managed.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 593–95 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
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Part IV then returns to the imponderables enumerated in the opening 
paragraphs of this Article, which ultimately become ponderable, when 
evaluated with reference to the dynamic, tripartite schema developed 
here. Reanalyzing these developments reveals a distinct trend, in which 
the scope of procedural and ethical impartiality is shrinking, while the 
reach of political impartiality is correspondingly expanding. The net 
effect is not, as some commentators have argued, that impartiality is 
under siege or diminishing; rather, impartiality is being transformed, 
from a value traditionally regulated in large part by judges and the legal 
establishment in the procedural and ethical dimensions, to one that is 
increasingly the province of the political dimension, where it is subject 
to regulation by the public and their elected representatives. The three-
dimensional construct developed here thus offers a new perspective on 
longstanding claims that the judiciary has become overly politicized, 
and, in so doing, illuminates approaches to reform. 
I.  PERSISTENT PARTIALITY PROBLEMS 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “impartial” as “[n]ot partial; 
not favouring one party or side more than another; unprejudiced, 
unbiased, fair, just, equitable.”15 Conversely, “partial” is defined as 
“unduly favouring one party or side in a suit or controversy, or one set 
or class of persons rather than another; prejudicied; biased; interested; 
unfair.”16 “Bias,” in turn, is defined as “[a]n inclination, leaning, 
tendency, bent; a preponderating disposition or propensity; 
predisposition towards; predilection; prejudice.”17 Finally, the Oxford 
English Dictionary defines “prejudice” as a “[p]reconceived opinion; 
bias or leaning favourable or unfavourable; prepossession . . . an 
instance of this; a feeling, favourable or unfavourable, towards any 
person or thing, prior to or not based on actual experience; bias, 
partiality,”18 and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
elaborates that it is “an opinion or leaning adverse to anything [formed] 
without just grounds or before sufficient knowledge.”19 
Impartiality, described in these ways, has been a defining feature of 
the judicial role dating back to antiquity. Plato recounts that in 399 BC, 
Socrates described a judge’s responsibilities in the following way: 
“Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to 
consider soberly, and to decide impartially.”20 To better understand how 
                                                                                                                     
 15. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 700 (2d ed. 1989). 
 16. Id. at 265. 
 17. Id. at 166. 
 18. Id. at 356–57. 
 19. 2 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 1788 (16th ed. 1971).  
 20. FRANKLIN PIERCE ADAMS, BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 466 (1952). 
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and why law regulates judicial impartiality, it helps to appreciate the 
range of perceived partiality problems to which lawyers, lawmakers, 
and judges have responded over time. Such an exercise requires an 
exploration beyond legal texts to sources that reflect broader public 
concerns. In the absence of polling data from the distant past, partiality 
problems as portrayed in literature (fictional and not) may be the next 
best proxy, for they illuminate how judicial partiality was understood by 
authors of the time—understandings intended to resonate with 
contemporary readers. Studying partiality problems of the past with 
reference to literature of the day comes with two caveats: first, literature 
offers insights into how judicial conduct was perceived, but not 
necessarily how judges actually behaved; and second, fiction writers 
can be expected to exaggerate perceived problems to make their points 
and sell books. Here, however, my objective is limited to categorizing 
the range of judicial biases and prejudices that have been on the public’s 
mind over time, where it is irrelevant that the nature and extent of such 
biases and prejudices have sometimes been exaggerated. Armed with 
this deeply rooted typology, it is comparatively easy work to sort and 
situate analogous events that implicate judicial partiality in current 
debate.  
Conceptions of judicial partiality, drawn from depictions in nonlegal 
texts, can be organized into four categories: judges who have personal 
interests in case outcomes; judges who have relational interests in case 
outcomes; judges who have political interests in case outcomes; and 
judges who have personal biases for or against case participants that are 
unattributable to the judges’ personal, relational, or political interests. 
A.  The Judge Who Has a Personal Interest in Case Outcomes 
The archetype of the partial judge is the corrupt jurist who solicits or 
accepts bribes. As early as the second century BC, Shudraka wrote of 
the need for judges to be “untouched by avarice.”21 William of 
Nassington and John Gower each complained of fourteenth century 
English judges siding with whichever party gave the judge the larger 
gift,22 and a folktale of that period—widely told across the Eurasian 
continent—recounted this phenomenon in humorous terms: A carpenter 
and a butcher took each other to court over a will. The carpenter gave 
the judge’s wife a wagon and the judge sided with the carpenter until 
the butcher presented the judge’s wife with four oxen to pull the wagon, 
whereupon the judge entered judgment for the butcher.23 “Turn the 
                                                                                                                     
 21. Shudraka, The Little Clay Cart, in 9 HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES 133–34 (Arthur 
William Ryder trans., 1905) (2007), available at http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/lcc.  
 22. KATHLEEN E. KENNEDY, MAINTENANCE, MEED, AND MARRIAGE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLISH 
LITERATURE 92, 96 (2009) (recounting the views of Nassington and Gower). 
 23. Theo Meder, Tales of Tricks and Greed and Big Surprises: Laymen’s Views of the 
7
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wagon,” called the carpenter to the judge, but the judge replied: “The 
wagon cannot be turned, for the oxen want to go the other way.”24 Three 
centuries later, concerns persisted. In England, A Poem on the Times 
wryly observed: 
The ambidextrous judges, bribed, rebrib’d 
And lesser gifts to greater still subscribed.25 
In an eighteenth century Chinese novel, Celebrated Cases of Judge Dee, 
the anonymous author wrote that “the amelioration of the common 
people depends on the honesty of the magistrate,” adding that 
“magistrates who let their conduct of a case be influenced by 
bribes . . . should never be appointed a ruler over others,” because “how 
could such men make their subordinates honest, and bring peace to the 
common people?”26 While the personal interest at stake for the partial 
judge is typically economic, that is not always so. In Shakespeare’s 
Measure for Measure, for example, the corrupt quid pro quo featured a 
judge who sought to trade a decision for sexual favors.27 
Partial judges have also been portrayed as abusing judicial power for 
personal gain by means other than the traditional quid pro quo. Geoffrey 
Chaucer’s Physician’s Tale concerned a “wicked judge” who paid a 
“churl” to falsely claim that a “noble knight’s” daughter was the churl’s 
slave so that the judge would have a pretext to take custody of the 
knight’s daughter and have his way with her.28 Judges who accepted 
gifts from interested parties after the case was over, or without express 
or implied assurances of reciprocation, raised the specter of partiality 
for personal gain without demonstrable corruption.29 In the absence of 
stable and adequate judicial salaries, such gifts were in lieu of income, 
and debate persists to this day on the extent to which the rampant 
bribery complained of in England throughout the middle part of the 
second millennium was real or merely perceived—particularly given the 
harsh penalties in place for bribery.30 There is no disputing, however, 
that gifts from parties invited favoritism, fueled widespread suspicions 
                                                                                                                     
Law in Dutch Oral Narrative, 21 HUMOR 435, 438–39 (2008). 
 24. Id. at 439. 
 25. Wilfrid Prest, Judicial Corruption in Early Modern England, 133 PAST & PRESENT 67, 
69 (1991) (quoting A Poem on the Times). 
 26. CELEBRATED CASES OF JUDGE DEE 5–6 (Robert Van Gulik trans., 1976). 
 27. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 4, lines 52–54. 
 28. See GEOFFREY CHAUCER, CANTERBURY TALES 283–90 (J.U. Nicolson trans., Garden 
City Publ’g Co. ed. 1934). 
 29. KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 111 (“Receiving payment after an impartial decision was 
still considered wrong.”). 
 30. Prest, supra note 25, at 72–73 (“If for no better reason than fear of the 
consequences . . . medieval judges cannot usually have behaved in ways which directly 
contravened the letter of their oath . . . .”). 
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of corruption, and were—with the exception of modest gifts of food and 
drink—regarded as troublesome.31 In 1620, Sir Francis Bacon was 
impeached for accepting gifts from litigants, despite his proof that he 
often ruled against his benefactors.32 Later that century, Sir Matthew 
Hale penned a personal code of judicial conduct that included the self-
admonition “[t]o abhor all private solicitations . . . in matters 
depending.”33 The practice of judges subsidizing their incomes by 
keeping the fines they assessed—a practice requiring disqualification of 
judges in English courts as early as 160934—likewise concerned a 
judge’s problematic personal interest in case outcomes outside the 
context of corrupt quid pro quos. 
Contemporary analogs: The judge who abuses his office for personal 
gain by taking bribes or accepting favors continues to exemplify the bad 
judge depicted in television series and films. In a new twist on this 
ancient problem, John Grisham’s The Appeal portrays an interested 
party who bought influence with a justice on the Mississippi Supreme 
Court by contributing to his election campaign.35 These stories mirror 
contemporaneous events: twice in the past generation, judicial 
corruption has held the spotlight on the nation’s biggest stage for 
official misconduct—congressional impeachment proceedings. In 1989, 
Congress impeached and removed District Judge Alcee Hastings for 
conspiring to solicit a bribe.36 And in 2010, Congress impeached and 
removed District Judge G. Thomas Porteous for, among other things, 
soliciting money from an attorney in a pending case.37 Sting operations 
aimed at rooting out judicial corruption at the local level have also made 
occasional headlines.38 Issues raised by Grisham’s The Appeal have 
played out in West Virginia and elsewhere as reformers have decried 
the influence, real or perceived, of campaign contributions on judicial 
decision making, and its adverse impact on judicial impartiality.39 In a 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Id. at 71–73. 
 32. MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON 70–
71 (1996). 
 33. LORD CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 208. 
 34. See Bonham v. Coll. of Physicians (Dr. Bonham’s Case), 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 
(1610). 
 35. See generally JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008). 
 36. EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL & PAUL FINKELMAN, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM 1787 TO THE PRESENT 172–74 (1999). 
 37. Details of the Articles of Impeachment for Porteous, CQ WEEKLY (Dec. 13, 2010), 
available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/document.php?id=weeklyreport111-00000377 
7898&type=toc&num=77&. 
 38. See, e.g., JAMES TUOHY & ROB WARDEN, GREYLORD: JUSTICE, CHICAGO STYLE 36–57 
(1989) (describing the “Greylord” sting operation); Drew Broach, Judges Probe Began with 1 
Tip: Bondsman Pointed Finger at Rival, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 31, 2011, at 
A1 (describing the “Wrinkled Robe” sting operation). 
 39. See JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009: 
9
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like vein, lawmakers and the media have criticized judges for taking 
expense paid “junkets” to educational seminars at vacation resorts, 
courtesy of corporations with an interest in cases coming before those 
judges, arguing that such trips create an appearance—if not the reality—
of partiality.40  
B.  The Judge Who Has a Relational Interest in Case Outcomes 
The concern that impartiality could be corrupted by a judge’s 
preexisting relationship with parties to a proceeding is longstanding. As 
early as the second century BC, Shudraka urged judges to show “equal 
grace” to “friend, foe, [and] kinsman.”41 The peril of judges being 
influenced by their friendships was a topic of concern in fourteenth 
century Europe. John Gower, writing in the 1370s, noted how difficult it 
was to bring suit against anyone who had ties to the judge, and 
criticized the practice of litigants finding nobles who were friendly with 
the judge to write letters vouching for litigants in court.42 
Authors have likewise chronicled the danger of partial judges 
presiding over trials of their enemies. In the fifteenth century, Thomas 
Hoclave recounted the story of a Persian judge who the king ordered to 
be flayed alive for sentencing a personal enemy to death.43 And in his 
quasi-historical work Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc, Mark 
Twain wrote of Bishop Cauchon—who presided at Joan’s trial for 
heresy notwithstanding his vested interest in her demise—that “this 
proposed judge was the prisoner’s outspoken enemy, and therefore he 
was incompetent to try her.”44 
Then, there are relatives. In Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland, the King was doubly encumbered: he was a judge 
presiding over a trial in which his tyrannical wife was the victim of an 
alleged tart theft, and he was a nincompoop.45 The resulting partiality 
problem manifested itself as a race to judgment. No sooner was the 
indictment read against the Knave of Hearts than the King-Judge, with 
the Queen scowling at his side, directed the jury to “[c]onsider your 
verdict,” prompting the herald (the white rabbit) to admonish the King: 
                                                                                                                     
DECADE OF CHANGE 1–4 (2010). Campaign contributors can likewise create an external political 
interest in case outcomes for the judge. See infra Section I.C.; Meryl J. Chertoff, Trends in 
Judicial Selection in the States, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 47, 48 (2010). 
 40.  See, e.g., Glen Elsasser, Activists Shine Light On Junkets For Judges, CHI. TRIB., July 
25, 2000, at N4; Editorial, Time to Ban Judicial Junkets, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2005, at A18. 
 41. Shudraka, supra note 21. 
 42. KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 96. 
 43. Id. at 111. 
 44. 2 MARK TWAIN, PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF JOAN OF ARC 64–65 (1896). 
 45. See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE 
LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 91–103 (Orion Publ’g Grp. 1993) (1865). 
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“Not yet, not yet! . . . There’s a great deal to come before that!”46 As the 
proceedings continued, the King passively abided the Queen’s mid-trial 
exhortations to declare the knave guilty and have him beheaded, before 
calling upon the jury to render a verdict “for about the twentieth time 
that day,” only to have the enraged Queen rejoin: “No, no! . . . Sentence 
first—verdict afterwards.”47 
Contemporary analogs: The risk of favoritism that relational 
conflicts of interest create is embodied in the contemporary adage: “A 
good lawyer knows the law; a great lawyer knows the judge.” In 2004, 
Justice Antonin Scalia provoked a media firestorm when he refused to 
withdraw from a case in which Vice President Dick Cheney was a party, 
after flying to Louisiana at the Vice President’s invitation for a weekend 
of duck hunting while the case was pending.48 In 2008, Wisconsin 
Supreme Court Justice Annette Ziegler was reprimanded for presiding 
over cases, as a court of appeals judge, in which her husband’s business 
was a party.49 More recently still, Justice Clarence Thomas’s 
qualifications to sit in a case concerning the constitutionality of health 
care reform legislation has been challenged on the grounds that 
organizations with which his wife was affiliated stood to gain if the 
legislation was invalidated.50  
C.  The Judge Who Has a Political Interest in Case Outcomes 
Impartiality has often been portrayed as compromised when judges 
have a political interest in the outcome of a proceeding. Political 
interests can be subdivided into the external and internal. External 
political interests are situated at the intersection between judicial 
impartiality and judicial independence: a judge’s impartiality is 
undermined when her political future is subject to manipulation or 
control by others who have an interest in the outcomes of cases the 
judge decides. Internal political interests, in contrast, relate to 
ideological zeal, which can bias the judge for or against litigants and 
lead her to prejudge cases.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Id. at 93. 
 47. Id. at 101. 
 48. See Editorial, The Court’s Honor at Stake, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 19, 
2004, at 20; Op-Ed., Duck Blinded: Scalia’s Trip Doesn’t Pass Smell Test, OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 
19, 2004, at 12A; Editorial, Justice in a Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A12; Editorial, 
Position Looks Compromising, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Feb. 3, 2004, at 16A; 
Editorial, Scalia’s Conflict of Interest, DENVER POST, Jan. 26, 2004, at B-07; Op-Ed., Scalia 
Tries to Duck Conflict with Waterfowl Reasoning, TAMPA TRIB. (Fla.), Jan. 26, 2004, at 18. 
 49. Steven Elbow, State Supreme Court Reprimands Ziegler in Unprecedented Ruling, 
CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), May 28, 2008. 
 50. Robert Barnes, As Health Case Looms, 2 Justices Targeted: Conservatives Attack 
Kagan While Liberals Slash at Thomas, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 4, 2011, at A23. 
11
Geyh: The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
504 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
Illustrations abound of judges whose impartiality has been depicted 
as compromised by external political interests. The most infamous 
example comes from the crucifixion scene in the New Testament: 
Pontius Pilate judged Jesus blameless, but acquiesced to calls for his 
crucifixion after the Jews cried out, saying “[i]f you let this man go, you 
are no friend of Caesar.”51 In Leo Tolstoy’s Resurrection, a panel of 
judges imposed a harsh sentence on the accused—notwithstanding its 
recognition that the jury had convicted her inadvertently by bungling 
the verdict forms—because the judges feared adverse publicity if they 
were perceived as lenient.52 Conversely, in A Child’s History of 
England, Charles Dickens idealized an impartial judge through the lens 
of a “doubtful” story in which a “brave and generous,” though “wild 
and dissipated,” prince drew a sword on the chief justice “because [the 
judge] was firm in dealing impartially with one of [the prince’s] 
dissolute companions.”53 The justice had the prince arrested, and the 
prince acquiesced, which offered King Henry, and Dickens, a teaching 
moment: “Happy is the monarch who has so just a judge, and a son so 
willing to obey the laws.”54  
Emblematic of the jurist whose internal political interests 
compromise his impartiality is the iconic “hanging judge.” Robert Louis 
Stevenson’s description of Lord Hermiston, in The Weir of Hermiston, 
is illustrative: “[H]e did not affect the virtue of impartiality; this was no 
case for refinement; there was a man to be hanged, he would have said, 
and he was hanging him. Nor was it possible to see his lordship, and 
acquit him of gusto in the task.”55 The hanging judge’s impartiality is 
thus undermined by his ideological predisposition to convict and 
execute, reflected in his indifference to the rule of law. A vivid, if 
disturbing, illustration comes from the story files of Judge Roy Bean: 
“Carlos Robles, this court finds you charged with a 
grave offense against the peace and dignity of the sovereign 
State of Texas, to wit: cattle rustlin’. How do you plead?” 
Unable to understand a word of English the defendant 
uttered a few sentences in Spanish. 
“Court accepts yore [sic] plea of guilty. The jury will 
now deliberate, and if'n it brings in a verdict short of 
hangin’ it’ll be declared in contempt. Gentlemen, what’s 
yore [sic] verdict?” 
                                                                                                                     
 51. John 19:12 (New International Version). 
 52. LEO TOLSTOY, RESURRECTION 95–97 (Anthony Briggs ed. & trans., Penguin Classics 
2009) (1899). 
 53. 1 CHARLES DICKENS, A CHILD’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND 268 (1853). 
 54. Id. 
 55. ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, WEIR OF HERMISTON 46 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1907) 
(1896). 
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“Guilty as hell, your honor.”56  
Contemporary analogs: If the hanging judge was emblematic of the 
nineteenth century jurist whose internal ideological predilections 
compromised his impartiality, the twenty-first century analog is the 
“activist judge.” The activist judge, whose constitutional and statutory 
analyses are polluted by her ideological biases, is not typically the stuff 
of riveting legal thrillers, but has achieved a prominent place in 
American political theater. At the turn of the twenty-first century, 
conservative court critics decried liberal activists—primarily in the 
federal district and circuit courts—who allegedly disregarded the law 
and substituted their political preferences. More recently, critics on the 
political left have responded in kind, by accusing the Supreme Court of 
conservative judicial activism.57 To address the problem of “activist” 
judges who compromise their impartiality by acting upon their internal 
political interests, court critics have, with mixed success, undertaken to 
impeach wayward judges, cut their budgets, curtail their jurisdiction, 
solicit their views (if not their commitments) on issues they are likely to 
decide as judges, and subject them to other means of political 
accountability.58 Court defenders, in turn, have characterized such 
efforts as aimed at manipulating judges into making decisions that the 
critics favor; put another way, court critics stand accused of seeking to 
control judges by exerting external political influence on the judges 
targeted, to the detriment of judicial independence and impartiality.59 In 
an age when “[w]e are all legal realists now,”60 it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the public would thus perceive political influences as 
posing two distinct threats to judges’ impartiality: internally, from 
judges who skew their rulings to implement their own political agendas, 
and externally, from outsiders who seek to implement their political 
agendas by conforming judges to their will. 
D.  The Judge Who Has a Personal Bias  
Bias is useful in this typology primarily as a residual category—a 
bin for forms of partiality that cannot otherwise be categorized as a 
judge’s personal, relational, or political interest in the outcome of a 
proceeding.61 A prominent subset of cases left for the “bias” category is 
                                                                                                                     
 56. RICHARD ERDOES, SALOONS OF THE OLD WEST 138 (1979). 
 57. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Criticism and Speech of Judges in the United States, 
in JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 257, 263–66 (H.P. Lee ed., 2011) (documenting 
attacks on judges).  
 58. See id. 
 59. See generally Charles G. Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 191 (2012) [hereinafter Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive?]. 
 60. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988). 
 61. Bias attributable to the judge’s prior relationship with an individual (rather than with 
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status- or group-based prejudice: unjustifiable fondness for or antipathy 
toward parties or other participants in the process because of their status 
as members of a particular race, ethnicity, class, gender, or other 
identifiable group.  
The forms of status- or group-based judicial bias with the most 
distinguished pedigree are wealth and class. At its basest level, judicial 
bias in favor of the wealthy and against the poor has one foot in corrupt 
judicial self-interest, discussed earlier: when judges award decisions to 
the highest bidder, rich parties win and poor parties lose. But the 
problem, as depicted over time, has transcended corruption. One scholar 
has described the work of medieval poets who decried “class justice,” in 
which “a poor man can hardly ever win against a rich man or a 
nobleman, no matter how just his case may be.”62 To counter the 
perceived problem, English judges took an oath as early as the 
fourteenth century “to do equal law and execution of right to all . . . rich 
or poor,”63 and in the seventeenth century, Sir Matthew Hale’s code of 
judicial conduct addressed this ongoing concern with the rule “[t]hat I 
be not biassed with compassion to the poor, or favor to the rich.”64 
In Amelia, published in 1751, Henry Fielding described a day in the 
court of Justice Thrasher, who: convicted a “poor woman,” falsely 
accused of streetwalking, after rejecting her truthful defense; dismissed 
charges against a “genteel young man and woman,” after “declar[ing] 
with much warmth that the fact [recounted in the charge against them] 
was incredible and impossible”; and convicted a “shabbily dressed” 
man, rejecting his truthful claim that the crime had been perpetrated by 
two others “who appeared to be men of fortune.”65 While Fielding noted 
that some of these proceedings were tainted by bribery, his final, 
sarcastic indictment of Thrasher went not to his corruption but to his 
bias against the poor: “In short, the magistrate had too great an honour 
for truth to suspect that she ever appeared in sordid apparel; nor did he 
ever sully his sublime notions of that virtue by uniting them with the 
mean ideas of poverty and distress.”66 
In William Godwin’s Things as They Are; or, The Adventures of 
Caleb Williams, published in 1794, the protagonist was a secretary, 
whose employer was a wealthy man who committed murder and framed 
the secretary for robbery.67 When the secretary defended himself by 
                                                                                                                     
the group to which the individual belongs), for example, is a form of relational interest; bias 
attributable to the issues a party raises is a form of political interest. 
 62. Meder, supra note 23, at 438. 
 63. Prest, supra note 25, at 71. 
 64. Quoted in LORD CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 208. 
 65. 1 HENRY FIELDING, AMELIA 8–9 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1962) (1751).  
 66. Id. at 10. 
 67. See WILLIAM GODWIN, THINGS AS THEY ARE; OR, THE ADVENTURES OF CALEB 
WILLIAMS (David McCracken, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1982) (1794). 
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reporting the truth, the judge summarily rebuffed him:  
A fine time of it indeed it would be, if, when gentlemen of 
six thousand a year take up their servants for robbing them, 
those servants could trump up such accusations as these, 
and could get any magistrate or court of justice to listen to 
them! . . . There would be a speedy end to all order and 
good government, if fellows that trample upon ranks and 
distinctions in this atrocious sort, were upon any 
consideration suffered to get off.68 
Ethnic, racial, and gender bias have likewise been featured in 
depictions of judicial conduct. In Amelia, Justice Thrasher found a 
defendant guilty, explaining: “Sirrah, your tongue betrays your guilt. 
You are an Irishman, and that is always sufficient evidence with me.”69 
In the 1898 nonfictional polemic J’Accuse!, Emile Zola attacked the 
French administration of justice for its court martial of Captain Alfred 
Dreyfus, which Zola attributed to a “‘dirty Jew’ obsession that is the 
scourge of our time.”70 In perhaps his most infamous tale, Judge Roy 
Bean purportedly acquitted a defendant of murder, reasoning that “I find 
the law very explicit on murdering your fellow man, but there’s nothing 
here about killing a Chinaman. Case dismissed”—an episode famous 
for its grotesque racial bias, but complicated by an overlay of political 
partiality: Bean was surrounded by an angry group of the perpetrator’s 
friends, who were intent on violence if their comrade was convicted.71 
And in the climactic trial scene of Mary Wollstonecraft’s eighteenth 
century novel The Wrongs of Woman, a misogynist judge trivialized the 
protagonist’s suffering at the hands of an abusive husband in a marriage 
she could not escape.72 “What virtuous woman thought of her 
feelings?,” he asked rhetorically, answering that “[i]t was her duty to 
love and obey the man chosen by her parents and relations, who were 
qualified by their experience to judge better for her, than she could for 
herself.”73  
What message do these depictions of judicial bias convey? 
Sometimes, as with Judge Roy Bean, they may be nothing more than 
stories about a judge with a bias—the isolated bad (if colorful) apple, 
                                                                                                                     
 68. Id. at 276. 
 69. FIELDING, supra note 65, at 8. 
 70. Emile Zola, J’Accuse!, L’AURORE (Paris, Fr.), Jan. 13, 1898, available at 
http://www.oxygenee.com/Zola-and-Dreyfus.pdf. 
 71. Shawn E. Tuma, Law in Texas Literature: Texas Justice—Judge Roy Bean Style, 21 
REV. LITIG. 551, 561 (2002). 
 72. See MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, THE WRONGS OF WOMAN 129–34 (W.W. Norton & Co. 
ed., 1994) (1798). 
 73.  Id. at 133. 
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whose misconduct is meant to say nothing about judges generally. At 
other times, however, the biased judge is portrayed as a representative 
sample from a bad barrel. Of Justice Thrasher, Fielding remarked that 
“[t]he higher we proceed among our public officers and magistrates, the 
less defects of this kind will, perhaps, be observable”74—which by 
negative implication meant that Thrasher’s defects were widely 
observable among “lower” magistrates. Godwin’s magistrate was the 
foil for an even more sweeping indictment: “And this at last was the 
justice of mankind!,” Caleb Williams railed, despairing that “six 
thousand a year shall protect a man from accusation; and the validity of 
an impeachment shall be superseded, because the author of it is a 
servant!”75 Similarly, Wollstonecraft’s judge was written into the 
climax of The Wrongs of Woman as emblematic of his gender and of the 
bias of men toward women. 
These categorical claims of judicial partiality imply a more 
intractable problem: impartiality is illusory. Judges are elites captured 
by their own biases, who will protect the interests of fellow elites at the 
expense of the general public. The sentiment is succinctly expressed in 
the African proverb: “Corn can’t expect justice from a court composed 
of chickens.”76 In Spoon River Anthology, published in 1916, Edgar Lee 
Masters made a similar, if narrower, point in an anecdote about a 
diminutive judge for whom “it was natural” to “ma[k]e it hard” on “the 
giants” who appeared before him, given the teasing the judge had 
endured earlier in life.77 Lighthearted though this story may be, it is but 
a short walk from there to the darker conclusion that judges are 
ensnared by the same prejudices that afflict us all—prejudices 
attributable to the influences of their class, gender, race, ethnicity, and 
life experiences. Some nineteenth century thinkers made that very point. 
Robert Green Ingersoll declared that “[w]e must remember that we have 
to make judges out of men, and that by being made judges their 
prejudices are not diminished and their intelligence is not increased.”78 
David Dudley Field echoed, “Judges are but men, and are swayed like 
other men by vehement prejudices. This is corruption in reality, give it 
whatever other name you please.”79 
Contemporary analogs: The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 
1960s has been retold in books and films that feature racist state judges 
                                                                                                                     
 74. FIELDING, supra note 65, at 6. 
 75. GODWIN, supra note 67, at 277. 
 76. MADISON MCGRAW, JUSTIFY THE MEANS 128 (2003). 
 77. Edgar Lee Masters, Judge Selah Lively, in SPOON RIVER ANTHOLOGY 94 (Bartleby 
1999) (1916), available at http://www.bartleby.com/84/94.html.  
 78. Robert G. Ingersoll, Speech in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 22, 1883). 
 79. David Dudley Field, A Few Words on Judicial Integrity, 6 ALBANY L.J. 265, 265 
(1872).  
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of the Jim Crow era and their heroic federal counterparts who weathered 
local animus and implemented new civil rights laws.80 In the 1980s and 
1990s, court systems undertook racial and gender bias studies that 
documented problems including, but not limited to, judges.81 The 
critical legal studies movement of the 1980s revisited the ancient 
problem of class bias in systemic terms, arguing that rules of law were 
written, enforced, and upheld by elites, including judges, who protect 
entrenched interests of the powerful at the expense of the powerless.82 
Critical race and feminist theories arose out of the critical legal studies 
movement and explored similar themes in the context of race, gender, 
ethnicity, and sexual orientation.83 Even more recently, minority judges 
have found themselves in the crosshairs of high-profile claims that their 
impartiality is compromised by bias: can a gay judge in a stable 
relationship fairly adjudicate the constitutionality of a law banning 
same-sex marriage?84 Is it problematic for a Latina judge to say that she 
will analyze cases differently than her white, male counterparts?85 
II.  THE DIMENSIONS OF IMPARTIALITY 
Writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had already come 
to the unremarkable conclusion that judges were human beings, and as 
such were subject to human prejudices.86 Social science research has 
since documented that judges, particularly Justices on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, are influenced by their ideological predilections.87 Some political 
                                                                                                                     
 80. As to books, see, for example, JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: A VIVID ACCOUNT OF 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BROWN DECISION IN THE SOUTH BY SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES 
COMMITTED TO THE RULE OF LAW (1981). As to films, see, for example, MISSISSIPPI BURNING 
(Orion Pictures 1988) (depicting FBI agents investigating the murder of civil rights workers). 
 81. See generally Blake D. Morant, Introductory Essay: The Relevance of Gender Bias 
Studies, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1073 (2001) (discussing racial and gender bias studies); Myra 
C. Selby, Examining Race and Gender Bias in the Courts: A Legacy of Indifference or 
Opportunity?, 32 IND. L. REV. 1167 (1999). 
 82. Allan C. Hutchinson, Introduction to CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1, 4 (Allan C. 
Hutchinson ed., 1989). 
 83. See, e.g., Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in CRITICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES, supra note 82, at 120–36; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and 
the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, in  CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 82, at 56–
76. 
 84. See Leff, supra note 5. 
 85. Julie Hirschfield Davis, Sotomayor Is Confirmed in Historic Vote by Senate, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), Aug. 7, 2009, at A1 (noting that opponents of Justice 
Sotomayor during her nomination process repeatedly cited a speech in which “she hoped a ‘wise 
Latina’ judge would usually make better decisions than a white man”). 
 86. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 87. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL xvi (1993) (“[W]e demonstrate that . . . the facts of the case and the ideology of the 
justices . . . successfully explain and predict the votes of Supreme Court justices.”).  
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scientists have discussed the ways in which judges strategically 
implement their policy preferences,88 while others have argued that the 
choices judges make are influenced by the audiences whose approval 
they seek.89 Studies of heuristics have shown that judges, like the 
general population, are apt to take mental shortcuts in their decision 
making by acting upon a range of subconscious biases.90 More recent 
research has documented the impact of judges’ race and gender on their 
decision making in discrimination cases.91 In short, perfect judicial 
impartiality does not exist.  
If perfect judicial impartiality is the elusive ideal, the more 
pragmatic quest is for “impartial enough.” That begs the question, 
“impartial enough for what?” The answer turns logically on the goal 
judicial impartiality seeks to achieve, a goal that judges and lawyers 
everywhere would identify, almost reflexively, as “the rule of law.” 
Insofar as we remove partiality from the decision making equation, 
what is left are the merits of the dispute before the judge—merits to be 
decided on the basis of applicable facts and law. And so, efforts to 
define the role of the judge in government typically emphasize the need 
for impartial judges to promote the rule of law.92  
In a world where imperfect impartiality is a constant, however, 
saying that impartial judges are needed to uphold the law merely skirts 
the question of how much partiality can be tolerated before rule of law 
objectives are thwarted to an unacceptable degree. Such an inquiry is 
further complicated by the realization that the law itself often is what it 
is because judges previously said that it was—judges who were 
influenced to an uncertain degree by their ideological and other 
                                                                                                                     
 88. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUDGES MAKE xiii (1998). 
 89. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR 4 (2006) (“I argue that judges care about the regard of salient audiences because they 
like that regard in itself, not just as a means to other ends. Further . . . judges’ interest in what 
their audiences think of them has fundamental effects on their behavior as decision makers.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–6, 15, 17–18, 27 (2007); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 779–84 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of 
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 571–75 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics 
and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 61, 64–65 (2000). 
 91. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An 
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 (2009); Jennifer L. 
Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal 
Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005). 
 92. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Pmbl. (2007) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] (“The 
United States legal system is based upon the principle that an independent, impartial, and 
competent judiciary . . . will interpret and apply the law that governs our society.”); A.B.A, 
JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST 
CENTURY JUDICIARY 9 (2003) (“[Judges] must, in short, be impartial if we are to be governed by 
the rule of law rather than judicial whim.”). 
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prejudices. A better understanding of how impartial a judge must be to 
uphold the rule of law requires an appreciation for who the beneficiaries 
of an impartial judiciary are. Put another way, whether a judge is 
“impartial enough” to uphold the law may depend on who we are trying 
to convince, why they care, and what is needed to convince them. As 
elaborated upon below, judicial impartiality serves three distinct 
audiences, giving rise to three distinct dimensions of impartiality: (1) 
parties and the procedural dimension, (2) the public and the political 
dimension, and (3) judges and the ethical dimension.  
Parties: At an elemental level, judges resolve disputes for the benefit 
of parties to those disputes. The stories of corrupt, conflicted, or biased 
judges, recounted in Part I, often cast losing parties as the ultimate 
victims—the martyrdom of Jesus Christ and Joan of Arc at the hands of 
partial judges being extreme examples. In the heat of battle, disputants 
may regard an impartial judge as their second choice; it would be best to 
have a partial judge who will rule in their favor. An impartial judge, 
however, remains preferable to a partial one who will rule against them, 
and if neither disputant controls the judge, an impartial judge is the 
safest alternative. Psychologist Tom Tyler has found that parties are 
more apt to accept adverse outcomes in litigation if they feel that they 
were subject to a fair process featuring a judge they regarded as 
impartial.93 For parties, then, the interest in judicial impartiality is 
personal to them, acutely felt, case-specific, and shaped by firsthand 
experience. The focus of their attention is on the process employed to 
litigate their cases, and whether that process protected them adequately 
from the perils of partiality summarized in Part I. This, then, is the 
procedural dimension of impartiality.  
Public: Judges may adjudicate disputes between private parties, but 
they are more than private dispute resolution specialists. They are public 
officials who together comprise a separate and independent branch of 
government, whose constitutional role is to serve as impartial guardians 
of the law. As such, their institutional legitimacy logically depends on 
the continuing support of the public that judges serve, which in turn 
depends on whether the public regards its judges as fulfilling their 
constitutional roles. If the decisions judges make lead the public to 
worry that judges are partial in ways that undermine their commitment 
to the rule of law, as the public defines it, the judiciary’s institutional 
legitimacy may suffer. Thus, in the Celebrated Cases of Judge Dee, 
discussed in Part I, the public is portrayed as the ultimate beneficiary of 
an impartial judiciary, because partial judges cannot “bring peace to the 
                                                                                                                     
 93. See TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 83 (1997); Tom R. 
Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of Their Courtroom 
Experience, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 69–70 (1984). 
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common people.”94 Relative to the parties, then, the public’s interest in 
an impartial judiciary is less personal than philosophical or ideological, 
more diffuse than acute, systemic rather than case-specific (although 
highly publicized cases can breed systemic concerns), and shaped less 
by firsthand experience than by impressions gleaned from public 
discussions on the acceptability of judges to the body politic. In other 
words, the focus of the public’s attention is on the impartiality of judges 
in relation to the role they play in the administration of government, 
which is “political” in the original sense of the term. This is the political 
dimension of impartiality.  
The Judge: For over two thousand years, being a good judge has 
meant being an impartial judge.95 Impartiality is a defining feature of 
the judicial role in ways it is not for other public officials: whereas 
legislators, city council members, mayors, governors, and presidents 
should be partial to their constituents’ preferences, judges should not. In 
the context of its procedural and political dimensions, impartiality is an 
instrumental value that serves other ends; being a “good judge” who 
impartially upholds the law is important to ensure a fair process to 
parties and to promote public confidence in the courts. There remains, 
however, an extent to which being “good” is an irreducible end in 
itself96: the corrupt or biased judge is simply “wicked,” to borrow 
Chaucer’s adjective from The Physician’s Tale.97 To the extent that 
being good is its own reward, judges themselves are the beneficiaries of 
their own impartiality. As adjudicators at the center of the litigation 
process, judges have an interest in the procedural dimension of 
impartiality; as representatives of the third branch of government, 
judges desire institutional legitimacy and consequently have an interest 
in the political dimension of impartiality, too. But as women and men 
whose self-identity as good judges is tethered to the oath they have 
sworn to be impartial—an oath judges have taken for centuries—there 
is a third dimension of impartiality: an ethical dimension.  
Thinking about impartiality in terms of its three dimensions yields a 
critically important insight: different dimensions may yield different 
answers to the question, how impartial is impartial enough? Depending 
on the context, the impartiality needed to provide parties with a fair 
hearing in the procedural dimension may be different than that needed 
                                                                                                                     
 94. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 96. Judicial independence is often characterized as an instrumental value that furthers 
other ends, such as the rule of law, and not as an end in itself. Impartiality, however, is different. 
Judicial independence qua freedom from external control is a privilege subject to abuse, while 
impartiality, as an unbiased, unprejudiced state of mind, is not. Therefore, in relation to the 
judicial role, independence cannot be characterized as an unqualified good in the way that 
impartiality can. 
 97. See CHAUCER, supra note 28. 
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to reassure the public in the political dimension, which may, in turn, 
differ from the impartiality required to ensure that judges are behaving 
honorably in the ethical dimension. To better understand the different 
ways in which the partiality problems identified in Part I are evaluated 
depending upon the dimension of impartiality at issue, it is helpful to 
look at the ways in which judicial impartiality is regulated. 
III.  REGULATING THE DIMENSIONS OF IMPARTIALITY 
The procedural, ethical, and political dimensions of judicial 
impartiality have been regulated in different but overlapping ways. The 
distinct means by which regulatory schemes manage judicial 
impartiality can, for the most part, be explained with reference to the 
varying goals of promoting judicial impartiality in the three dimensions: 
to ensure procedural fairness for parties in the litigation process; to 
encourage judges to conduct themselves honorably and ethically; and to 
preserve public confidence in the courts. A full appreciation of these 
regulatory mechanisms, however, also requires that they be understood 
against the backdrop of historical, pragmatic, and other constraints that 
have affected their development.  
I elaborate here on the primary mechanisms that regulate impartiality 
in each dimension: due process, disqualification, and rules of litigation 
procedure in the procedural dimension; codes of judicial conduct and 
disciplinary processes in the ethical dimension; and removal, selection, 
and oversight in the political dimension. In so doing, I do not mean to 
imply that the compartmentalization of judicial impartiality is tidy.98 
Mechanisms that I have assigned to one dimension can serve the 
interests of another. For example, disqualification rules that parties 
exploit to protect their rights to an impartial judge in the procedural 
dimension also serve as standards of good judicial conduct in the ethical 
dimension.99 Codes of judicial conduct, while centered in the ethical 
dimension, include rules oriented toward ensuring a fair process for 
parties100 and promoting public confidence in the courts,101 which 
                                                                                                                     
 98. Professor Stephen Burbank has expressed a preference for “the messiness of lived 
experience to the tidiness of unrealistically parsimonious models.” Stephen B. Burbank, On the 
Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science, and Humility, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO 
DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 41, 53 (Charles 
Gardner Geyh ed., 2011). While Professor Burbank was writing about quantitative models, his 
point applies equally to theory. There is a line between simplification and oversimplification 
that scholars must not cross. 
 99. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006), with U.S. COURTS, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED 
STATES JUDGES Canon 3C (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/us 
courts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf. 
 100. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.2 & cmt. 1 (requiring judges to “perform 
all duties of judicial office . . . impartially,” to “ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties”); 
id. R. 2.6 & cmt. 1 (requiring that judges guarantee all parties “the right to be heard according to 
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overlap with the procedural and political dimensions, respectively. 
Impeachment, while a remedy for judges whose partiality violates the 
public trust in the political dimension, also delineates standards of 
judicial conduct that inform the ethical dimension.102 Notwithstanding 
such messiness at the margins, thinking about judicial impartiality in 
relation to the dimensions it occupies is worth the trouble because it 
elucidates the complexities and seeming contradictions that pervade the 
subject and gave rise to the imponderables that introduced this Article.  
A.  Regulating Impartiality in the Procedural Dimension 
There are three basic procedural mechanisms that are brought to bear 
to preserve impartiality for the benefit of parties to litigation: (1) the 
Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions, (2) 
disqualification processes, and (3) rules of litigation procedure. 
Understanding the scope and limits of these mechanisms requires an 
appreciation for the relationship between their ends and means, and the 
constraints under which they operate.  
All three mechanisms in the procedural dimension are implemented 
by judges, as part of a larger mission to administer justice on a case-by-
case basis. As a consequence, the pursuit of impartiality is necessarily 
tempered by the constraints of broader systemic goals. Achieving near-
perfect impartiality among judges assigned to hear cases through the 
application of overly rigorous processes that compound costs, 
exacerbate delays, and compromise the supply of available judges 
would purge partiality at the expense of thwarting access to justice, and 
thus rob Peter to pay Paul. Hence, the three procedural mechanisms that 
promote judicial impartiality must be construed, applied, and ultimately 
limited in light of the systemic objective of ensuring the effective and 
expeditious administration of justice. Thus, the process that is “due” 
parties under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is constrained by an 
assessment of the burdens that additional process would impose.103 
Ethics rules forbid recusal except when disqualification is required 
because “[j]udges must be available to decide the matters that come 
before the court,”104 while the “rule of necessity” directs otherwise 
                                                                                                                     
law,” which is “an essential component of a[n] . . . impartial system of justice”). 
 101. See, e.g., id. R. 1.2 (“A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the . . . impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety.”). 
 102. See infra notes 204–209 and accompanying text (discussing impeachment as a remedy 
for less than “good” behavior). 
 103. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“[T]he specific dictates of due 
process generally requires consideration of . . . the Government’s interest, including . . . the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.”). 
 104. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.7, cmt. 1. 
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disqualified judges to hear cases when no other judge would be 
qualified to sit.105 The first rule in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
emphasizes that the rules seek not only “just” determinations, but 
“speedy[] and inexpensive” ones as well.106 
At a minimum, these systemic constraints render the procedural 
dimension ill-suited to address the sweeping claims of partiality 
described in Part I—that judges are activists whose ideological 
predilections create political conflicts of interest that undermine their 
impartiality, or that judges are unacceptably biased because of their 
class, race, gender, or other status. And so, attempts to remove judges 
from cases in litigation on the basis of such categorical claims have 
fallen on deaf ears.107 As elaborated upon next, the three mechanisms in 
the procedural dimension are best suited to ameliorate judicial partiality 
in more limited, narrowly targeted, case-specific ways.  
1.  The Due Process Clauses 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution 
prohibit the national and state governments from depriving persons of 
their life, liberty, or property without due process of law.108 In addition, 
many state constitutions have a due process clause of their own.109 In 
popular culture, an impartial adjudicator has been a defining feature of a 
fair judicial process for more than two thousand years.110 It is thus 
unsurprising that the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Due 
Process Clause in a manner consistent with that ancient understanding 
by declaring that “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of 
due process,”111 and that the Due Process Clause guarantees parties the 
“right to have an impartial judge.”112  
The Due Process Clauses articulate broad principles, but are of only 
modest importance in the daily regulation of judicial impartiality in the 
procedural dimension. The circumstances in which the Court has 
actually held that the “right to have an impartial judge” was violated are 
few and limited. The Court has reversed judgments where a state judge 
has: kept the fines he assessed against parties that appeared before 
                                                                                                                     
 105. See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN 
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW 13–15 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter GEYH, DISQUALIFICATION], 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/judicialdq.pdf/$file/judicialdq.pdf. 
 106. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 107. See FLAMM, supra note 9, § 10.3. 
 108. See U.S. CONST. amend V; id. amend XIV. 
 109. See Anthony B. Sanders, The “New Judicial Federalism” Before its Time: A 
Comprehensive Review of Economic Substantive Due Process Under State Constitutional Law 
Since 1940 and the Reasons for its Recent Decline, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 467 (2005). 
 110. See supra Part I. 
 111. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
 112. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927). 
23
Geyh: The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
516 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
him;113 ruled on the merits of issues that he himself was litigating as a 
private party in an unrelated proceeding;114 presided over criminal 
contempt proceedings in which the defendants’ allegedly contemptuous 
conduct had been directed toward the judge;115 and heard a case in 
which a party’s recent support for the judge’s election campaign was so 
substantial as to create a probability of bias.116 Such limited application 
is attributable to historical, pragmatic, and prudential constraints.  
Historically, civil and common law systems each afforded parties 
ample opportunity to challenge the impartiality of their respective fact-
finders—judges under civil law and jurors under common law.117 
English common law judges, however, were entitled to an almost 
ironclad presumption of impartiality, subject to a lone exception for 
cases in which they had an economic interest in the outcome.118 Two 
and a half centuries later, the four dissenting Justices in Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co. pointed to this ancient presumption in support of 
their argument that a probability of judicial bias does not violate due 
process,119 a point the majority deflected by emphasizing how 
exceptional and extreme the facts of Caperton were.120 In other words, 
the ancient presumption of impartiality limits the application of the Due 
Process Clause to deeply rooted exceptions and truly outrageous 
circumstances. 
Pragmatically, some forms of partiality are more manageable to 
regulate than others. For example, personal conflicts of interest—the 
first form of partiality that the Supreme Court recognized as implicating 
due process concerns121—can be delineated by clear(ish) rules triggered 
whenever a conflict arises. Divining judicial bias, in contrast, requires 
an assessment of the judge’s subjective state of mind—a difficult task 
that courts have long been reluctant to undertake.122 In Caperton, the 
                                                                                                                     
 113. See, e.g., id. at 523. 
 114. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 823–24 (1986). 
 115. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 503 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 
U.S. 455, 466 (1971); Murchison, 349 U.S. at 139. 
 116. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264–65, 2267 (2009). 
 117. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV. 
LITIG. 671, 677–78 (2011). 
 118. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 611–12 (1947). 
 119. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“There is a ‘presumption of 
honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators’ . . . . All judges take an oath to uphold the 
Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we trust that they will live up to this promise.”). 
 120. Id. at 2263, 2265 (majority opinion) (noting that “this is an exceptional case” and 
“[t]he facts now before us are extreme by any measure”). 
 121. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
 122. See Inhabitants of Northampton v. Smith, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 390, 396 (1846) (“[A]n 
interest in a question or subject matter, arising from feeling and sympathy, may be more 
efficacious in influencing the judgment, than even a pecuniary interest; but an interest of such a 
character would be too vague to serve as a test . . . .”); Frank, supra note 118, at 611–12 
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majority sought to make such assessments more manageable by crafting 
an objective “probability” of bias standard for assessing due process 
claims.123 Chief Justice John Roberts, writing on behalf of the four 
dissenters, was unconvinced and itemized forty questions that the new 
standard left unanswered, leading him to the conclusion that regulating 
probable bias was unworkable.124 The majority’s rejoinder was to 
emphasize, repeatedly, how rarely its probable bias standard would be 
triggered.125 
Prudentially, the Due Process Clause is a backstop, or last resort, 
constrained by respect for separation of powers and federalism 
concerns, that “demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial 
disqualifications.”126 While the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
presumably guarantees litigants the right to an impartial judge in federal 
court, federal courts have long avoided constitutional questions when 
cases can be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds.127 Given the 
availability of disqualification under federal statute,128 then, recourse to 
the Fifth Amendment is unnecessary. The need for state courts to 
ameliorate judicial partiality through resort to the Fourteenth 
Amendment or the due process clauses of their own constitutions is 
similarly obviated by the availability of state disqualification rules.129 
Although the Fourteenth Amendment affords federal courts the 
opportunity to address the qualifications of state judges, principles of 
comity and federalism have restricted the reach of Fourteenth 
Amendment claims. In Tumey v. Ohio,130 for example, the Court ruled 
that the Due Process Clause forbade a judge from presiding over a case 
in which he had a financial conflict of interest, but not before opining 
that “[a]ll questions of judicial qualification may not involve 
constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state 
policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters 
                                                                                                                     
(“English common law practice at the time of the establishment of the American court system 
was simple in the extreme. Judges disqualified for financial interest. No other disqualifications 
were permitted, and bias . . . was rejected entirely.”). 
 123. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265. 
 124. Id. at 2267, 2269–72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 125. See id. at 2265–67 (majority opinion). 
 126. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986). 
 127. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly 
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be 
disposed of.”). 
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006). 
 129. State courts, like their federal counterparts, adhere to Ashwander avoidance principles. 
See, e.g., Jack Tuholske, Going With the Flow: The Montana Court’s Conservative Approach to 
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 MONT. L. REV. 237, 242–43 (2011) (noting that the state 
supreme court implemented Ashwander principles). 
 130. 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
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merely of legislative discretion.”131 Given the stories recounted in Part 
I—which predate when Tumey was decided in 1927, and show a deeply 
rooted antipathy toward judges who preside in the teeth of relational 
conflicts and personal biases—the suggestion that kinship and bias did 
not implicate core due process concerns can only be explained in terms 
of the historical, pragmatic, and prudential constraints summarized here. 
2.  Disqualification 
In the procedural dimension, disqualification rules seek to ensure 
parties a fair hearing by affording them an opportunity to challenge the 
impartiality of their assigned judge. As previously noted, 
disqualification rules likewise serve as standards of conduct in the 
ethical dimension of impartiality.132 Those standards are more or less 
uniform across state and federal systems,133 and between procedural and 
ethical dimensions,134 with the Model Code of Judicial Conduct serving 
as a template.135 The Model Code makes provision to disqualify judges 
for many of the chronic partiality problems recounted in Part I. Personal 
and relational conflicts of interest are addressed by rules requiring 
disqualification when the judge or the judge’s close relatives are 
parties,136 lawyers,137 or material witnesses138 in a case; when they have 
an economic139 or other interest140 in the outcome of the proceeding; 
under limited circumstances, when the firm141 or governmental entity142 
where the judge previously worked appears before her; and when a 
judge as a judicial candidate receives campaign contributions from 
                                                                                                                     
 131. Id. at 523. 
 132. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 133. See ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, Taking Disqualification Seriously, 92 
JUDICATURE 12, 14–15 (2008). 
 134. For example, the standards for disqualification in 28 U.S.C. § 455, which grants 
parties a procedural right to challenge a judge’s partiality, are basically the same as the 
standards in Canon 3C of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, which regulates 
disqualification as a matter of judicial ethics. See also GEYH, DISQUALIFICATION, supra note 
105, at 2. 
 135. ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, supra note 133, at 14 (noting that state codes 
of judicial conduct are based on the Model Code of Judicial Conduct “in the vast majority of 
states”). 
 136. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.11(A)(2)(a). 
 137. Id. R. 2.11(A)(2)(b). 
 138. Id. R. 2.11(A)(2)(d). 
 139. Id. R. 2.11(A)(3). 
 140. Id. R. 2.11(A)(2)(c). 
 141. Id. R. 2.11(A)(6)(a) (requiring disqualification when the judge “was associated with a 
lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association”). 
 142. Id. R. 2.11(A)(6)(b) (requiring disqualification when the judge “served in governmental 
employment, and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public 
official concerning the proceeding”). 
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parties or lawyers in excess of a specified amount.143 Political conflicts 
of interest are likewise addressed in part by this last rule, insofar as 
campaign contributions are perceived as an external source of political 
influence on judicial decision making, and by a rule requiring 
disqualification when a judge publicly pre-commits herself to reach a 
particular result in a future case.144 Finally, bias is addressed by rules 
requiring disqualification when the judge “has a personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer.”145 
Disqualification is subject to some of the same constraints that shape 
the scope of due process. Historically, judges have enjoyed the same 
presumption of impartiality that limits the application of due process 
analysis.146 Pragmatically, the subjective nature of judicial bias has 
limited its reach as a traditional ground for disqualification.147  
More fundamentally, perhaps, the same judges who administer 
disqualification rules self-identify collectively as impartial and have 
done so for millennia; to concede bias under such circumstances is, in 
effect, to concede failure.148 To offset these constraints, the Model Code 
calls for disqualification when the judge’s “impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned,”149 which seeks to avoid problematic 
inquiries into the judge’s subjective state of mind with an objective 
standard, and to lessen the stigma of disqualification by focusing on 
perceived partiality, rather than partiality in fact.150 Because judges are 
under a separate ethical directive to avoid perceived partiality (as a 
subset of the duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety), however, 
judicial ambivalence over disqualification lingers.151 One multistate 
study showed that judges are least troubled by disqualification for 
                                                                                                                     
 143. Id. R. 2.11(A)(4). 
 144. Id. R. 2.11(A)(5). 
 145. Id. R. 2.11(A)(1). 
 146. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 361 (“[J]udges 
or justices cannot be challenged,” because “the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or 
favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority 
greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.”). 
 147. FLAMM, supra note 9, § 3.2 (discussing proof problems limiting disqualification for 
actual bias). 
 148. See Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 117, at 678–79. 
 149. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.11(A). 
 150. Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 117, at 690–92. 
 151. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (directing judges to avoid the appearance 
of impropriety, and explaining that “[t]he test” for an appearance of impropriety is, among other 
things, “whether the [judge’s] conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception” that 
“reflects adversely on the judge’s . . . impartiality”); see also Geyh, Why Judicial 
Disqualification Matters, supra note 117, at 703–04 (discussing tension between the appearance 
of partiality in disqualification proceedings, and the ethical directive to avoid the appearance of 
impropriety). 
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traditional conflicts of interest,152 where the rules are relatively clear, 
and disqualification is automatic when facts giving rise to a conflict are 
present—for example, when the judge holds stock in the defendant 
corporation, or the judge’s brother is the plaintiff. Conversely, 
ambivalence rises with more discretionary inquiries into the judge’s 
biases or personal relationships with case participants.153 Simply put, 
because disqualification rules require judges to rule on the partiality of 
their brethren, and often themselves, judicial construction of those rules 
can be expected to err on the side of the presumption of impartiality.  
3.  Rules of Litigation Procedure 
 The law that regulates the way judges decide cases is embodied in 
procedural rules and statutes that, with exceptions, regulate judicial 
partiality only indirectly. One obvious exception is state and federal 
disqualification rules and statutes, which I have already touched upon. 
A second exception is the judicial oath of office, which, in the federal 
system at least, is situated among procedural statutes regulating the 
courts, and pursuant to which judges swear to discharge their duties 
impartially.154 
More generally, however, the law governing litigation procedure 
implements an adversarial system by means of rules that manage 
judicial partiality more subtly. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) abandoned the complex formalities of common law pleading 
that had thwarted litigants from getting their cases heard on the merits 
by, among other things, reducing the multiplicity of common law causes 
of action to a single civil action,155 and reducing the plaintiff’s burden 
of initial pleading to supplying “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”156 
The paradigmatic merits determination in suits at common law is the 
jury verdict, which follows a trial where the judge officiates between 
adversaries. As previously noted, rigorous procedures seek to ensure the 
impartiality of jurors as fact finders, as contrasted with judges, who 
enjoy a more robust presumption of impartiality in their traditional role 
as umpires on questions of law.157 While the FRCP afford judges 
opportunities to decide cases on the merits prior to trial, those 
                                                                                                                     
 152. JEFFREY SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 69 (1995) (“[T]he survey showed a sensitivity to 
conflicts of interest and a concern for judicial impartiality”). 
 153. Id. at 1. 
 154. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006) (“I, ___, do solemnly swear . . . that I will faithfully and 
impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me . . . .”). 
 155. FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
 156. Id. at 8(a). 
 157. See supra note 117–119 and accompanying text. 
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opportunities are carefully circumscribed to reduce the risk of 
uninformed, premature judgments that could fairly be characterized as 
prejudice. Thus, for example, in a defendant’s motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, the judge must accept as true all facts alleged in 
the complaint, and must err on the side of non-dismissal by construing 
the complaint liberally and “draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in 
plaintiff’s favor.”158 And at the summary judgment stage, the judge 
must let the case proceed to trial unless there is “no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact.”159  
At an elemental level, then, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the adversarial process it regulates restrict the authority of judges to act 
upon their predispositions, prejudices, and personal biases by sharply 
limiting their opportunities to end cases before the necessary facts can 
be adduced and the merits explored. Professor Judith Resnik described 
the underlying problem as one of prejudgment: 
Deciding at one point in time versus another is not 
intrinsically faulty unless the assumption is that 
prejudgment is based upon incomplete or inaccurate 
information. Prejudgment is suspect in the context of a 
system that assumes an increase in information over time 
and designates specific points in time when the act of 
judging becomes legitimate.160 
By necessary implication, prejudgment is illegitimate because judges 
who lack the information needed to make reasoned determinations on 
the merits must ground their decisions in under-informed speculation 
that is prejudiced (and hence, partial) by definition.161 Professor Lon 
Fuller credited the adversarial process with imposing a structure that 
controls the judge’s propensity toward premature decisions grounded in 
personal predilections: 
 An adversary presentation seems the only effective 
means for combating this natural human tendency to judge 
too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet 
fully known. The arguments of counsel hold the case, as it 
were, in suspension between two opposing interpretations 
of it. While the proper classification of the case is thus kept 
unresolved, there is time to explore all of its peculiarities 
                                                                                                                     
 158. 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34(1)(b) (3d ed. 
2012). 
 159. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 160. Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our 
Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1885 (1988). 
 161. See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. 
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and nuances.162 
Appellate review operates as another indirect procedural check on 
partiality. Appellate review is commonly justified in terms of the need 
to correct lower court errors.163 To the extent that such errors were 
caused by judicial partiality, obviously enough, the appellate process 
corrects those errors, too.164 In mandamus proceedings, when partiality 
leads to errors so egregious as to constitute usurpations of judicial 
power, circuit courts have sometimes admonished district judges for 
their lack of impartiality.165 In addition to reversing erroneous rulings 
that may have been the product of a partial judge, federal circuit courts 
of appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court are authorized by statute to 
remand actions and “require such further proceedings to be had as may 
be just under the circumstances.”166 The circuit courts of appeal have 
construed this as permitting remand to a different district judge when 
the circuit court is concerned about the impartiality of the judge to 
whom the case was originally assigned.167  
As noted at the outset of this Section on the procedural dimension of 
impartiality, judges have a system to run, which operates as a constraint 
on the application of procedures aimed at curbing partiality to the extent 
that such procedures are in tension with the “speedy[] and inexpensive 
determination” of civil actions.168 Procedures that defer resolution of 
cases on the merits pending discovery or trial reduce the risk of 
premature judgment at the expense of protracting proceedings for what 
may be a very busy court and cost-conscious parties. As elaborated 
upon in Part IV, the Supreme Court’s recent reinterpretation of pleading 
standards has made this constraint increasingly salient in the past 
generation. 
                                                                                                                     
 162. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 383 
(1978). 
 163. GENE SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 479 (4th 
ed. 2009) (“One purpose of appeal is to ensure the correctness of lower court dispositions.”). 
 164. At common law, where disqualification for bias was not permitted, appeal was 
recognized as the primary remedy for parties victimized by judicial partiality. McCauley v. 
Weller, 12 Cal. 500, 523–24 (Cal. 1859) (explaining that jurors are disqualified more readily 
than judges and that the premature “expression of an unqualified opinion on the merits” will 
disqualify a juror, but not a judge, because a judge’s decisions are subject to appeal). 
 165. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 243, 297–302 (1993). 
 166. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006). 
 167. See GEYH, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION, supra note 105, at 109–13 (2010) (discussing 
the circumstances in which circuit courts have reassigned cases to a different judge under 
§ 2106). 
 168. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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B.  Regulating Impartiality in the Ethical Dimension 
In the ethical dimension, impartiality is an end in itself for the good 
judge. The ethics of impartiality are managed primarily by codes of 
judicial conduct and the disciplinary processes that implement them.  
Elaborating on the ways such codes operate in the ethical dimension 
is simplified by the fact that the Code of Conduct for United States 
Judges and the codes of judicial conduct for virtually every state 
judiciary are derived, to varying degrees, from the American Bar 
Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct.169 Conversely, 
describing the role of the codes is complicated by the different niches 
the codes occupy in state and federal systems. The Model Code 
envisions being used in the manner state systems use it: as a guide to 
judges on their ethical obligations and as a basis for enforcement in 
disciplinary proceedings if the Code is violated.170 The federal system, 
in contrast, uses the Code primarily as a tool for guidance.171 While the 
Judicial Conference has acknowledged that sometimes Code violations 
can serve as a basis for discipline,172 the disciplinary process in the 
federal system operates independently of the Code and subjects judges 
to limited forms of discipline for “conduct prejudicial to the effective 
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.”173  
Either way, however, codes of conduct intersect with impartiality in 
the ethical dimension. The preamble to the Model Code declares its goal 
to “assist judges in maintaining the highest standards of judicial and 
personal conduct,”174 and, to that end, the first Canon in the Code 
directs judges to “uphold and promote the . . . impartiality of the 
judiciary.”175  
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct is replete with rules directing 
judges to avoid conduct that jeopardizes judicial impartiality in each of 
the four persistent problem areas described in Part I. In addition to the 
Code’s disqualification rule—which, as previously described, does 
double duty in the procedural dimension and includes provisions 
applicable to each problem area176—additional rules elaborate in more 
targeted ways on a judge’s ethical obligation to avoid specific partiality 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s 
Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000) 
(noting that forty-nine states have adopted some form of the ABA Model Code). 
 170. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, pmbl. para. 3. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-
DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS 28 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/judicialmis 
conduct/jud_conduct_and_disability_308_app_B_rev.pdf. 
 173. 28 U.S.C § 351. 
 174. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, pmbl. para. 3. 
 175. Id. Canon 1. 
 176. See supra notes 133–153 and accompanying text. 
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problems.177  
By virtue of addressing the same partiality problems enumerated in 
Part I, regulatory mechanisms in the procedural and ethical dimensions 
undeniably overlap. Some rules in the Model Code explicitly admonish 
judges to act impartially and to avoid conduct that calls their 
impartiality into question.178 If a judge is sanctioned for violating one of 
these rules in the context of a pending case, the ethical lapse would 
seem to furnish irrefutable proof that the judge’s “impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned” for parties seeking disqualification, thereby 
creating a bridge between the ethical and procedural dimensions.  
Areas of overlap notwithstanding, impartiality is regarded and 
regulated differently in the two dimensions. Some conduct that is 
deemed problematic in the ethical dimension of impartiality is not 
necessarily problematic in the procedural dimension. There are rules in 
the Model Code that regulate impartiality less than explicitly, through 
prophylactic restrictions on judicial speech or conduct that poses an 
unacceptable risk of real or perceived partiality. For example, the Code 
directs judges not to “initiate, permit, or consider ex parte 
communications,” and does so because ex parte communications 
jeopardize impartiality by affording a party one-sided access to the 
judge, thereby aligning the judge with that party.179 Another rule 
                                                                                                                     
 177. Personal conflicts: MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.4(B) (prohibiting financial 
interests from influencing the judge’s conduct); id. R. 3.11(B), (C) (prohibiting continuing 
business relationships with people likely to come before the judge); id. R. 3.13 (restricting gifts 
judges may receive). Relational conflicts: id. R. 2.4(B) (prohibiting family and social 
relationships from affecting a judge’s judgment). Political conflicts: id. R. 2.4(A), (C) 
(prohibiting judges from being “swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism,” and from 
allowing political interests or relationships to influence their conduct); id. R. 2.2 cmt. 2 
(directing judges to “interpret and apply the law without regard to whether the judge approves or 
disapproves of the law in question”); id. Canon 4 (prohibiting judges from engaging in political 
activities that are “inconsistent with the . . . impartiality of the judiciary”). Bias: id. R. 2.3(B) 
(directing judges to avoid bias and prejudice on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, sexual 
orientation, socioeconomic status, etc.); id. R. 3.6(A) (prohibiting judicial membership in 
private organizations that practice invidious discrimination). 
 178. See, e.g., id. R. 1.2 (directing the judge to “act at all times in a manner that promotes 
public confidence in the . . . impartiality of the judiciary”); id. R. 2.2 (directing the judge to 
“perform all duties of judicial office . . . impartially”); id. R. 2.11 (requiring disqualification “in 
any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned”); id. R. 2.13 
(directing the judge to “exercise the power of appointment impartially”); id. R. 3.1 (directing the 
judge not to “participate in activities that would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the 
judge’s . . . impartiality”); id. R. 3.13 (directing the judge not to “accept any gifts, loans, 
bequests, benefits, or other things of value, if acceptance . . . would appear to a reasonable 
person to undermine the judge’s . . . impartiality”); id. Canon 4 (directing the judge not to 
“engage in political or campaign activity that is inconsistent with the . . . impartiality of the 
judiciary”). 
 179. Id. R. 2.9; JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 5-1 (4th ed. 2007) 
(explaining that ex parte communications are prohibited because “the judge may be exposed to 
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admonishes judges to avoid making “any public statement that might 
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a 
matter pending or impending,” which an accompanying comment 
explains is “essential to the maintenance of the . . . impartiality of the 
judiciary.”180 Sometimes, judges who make improper ex parte 
communications or public statements on pending cases are ordered to 
disqualify themselves,181 but not always. As one treatise has 
summarized the state of the law: “Out-of-court comments about a 
pending case, like ex parte conversations, are prohibited for other 
reasons, but they will not be considered disqualifying on the basis of 
impermissible bias unless they go too far.”182 
In the ethical dimension, ex parte communications (with enumerated 
exceptions) are categorically improper because of the threat they pose to 
the judge’s real or perceived impartiality. But in the procedural 
dimension, such communications do not justify the comparably 
categorical conclusion that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned for purposes of disqualification. Rather, the communications 
must be evaluated case by case to see if they go “too far.” Similarly, 
public comments on pending cases that are improper in the ethical 
dimension do not trigger automatic disqualification in the procedural 
dimension; disqualification is largely limited to bias emanating from an 
extrajudicial source, because it is to be expected that judges will form 
views about claims and parties during judicial proceedings. Unless a 
judge’s public comments reveal extrajudicial bias or an utter incapacity 
to be fair, disqualification is unwarranted.183 Viewed another way, 
judges who adopt and enforce codes of conduct in the ethical dimension 
                                                                                                                     
only one side of an argument or an isolated source of information, to the detriment of the 
judge’s impartiality”); FLAMM, supra note 9, at 374 (“[W]henever a judge initiates or entertains 
ex parte communications, a question may reasonably be raised about his ability to be impartial 
in disposing of questions germane to the subject of such communications. It is, therefore, 
ordinarily considered improper for a judge to either initiate or consider such communications 
during the course of a proceeding, except to the limited extent authorized by law.”). 
 180. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.10 & cmt. 1. 
 181. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 116–18 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(requiring disqualification for statements to reporters); FLAMM, supra note 9, at 374–75 
(“[W]here a judge violates this rule [against ex parte communications], he is ordinarily obliged 
to recuse himself from presiding over that proceeding . . . .”). 
 182. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 179, at 4-24; see also FLAMM, supra note 9, at 406 & n.2 
(“[T]he fact that a judge has engaged in ex parte communications, standing alone, is not 
necessarily sufficient to warrant disqualification . . . .”); LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL 
DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3C OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 27, 29–30 (2d ed. 
1986). 
 183. United States v. Barry, 961 F.2d 260, 263–65 (D.C. Cir. 1992); ALFINI ET AL., supra 
note 179, at 4-24 (“Even strong statements made out-of-court about a pending case are not 
disqualifying if they do not stem from an extrajudicial source and so long as they do not go so 
far as to show that the judge’s mind is closed.”). 
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apply prophylactic standards to guide good judges away from conduct 
that could impugn their impartiality, whereas judges in the procedural 
dimension are subject to the added constraints of having dockets to 
manage and a system to administer, which counsels against the 
application of disqualification rules that are any broader than necessary 
to assure parties a fair hearing in the case in question.  
Conversely, some conduct that is deemed problematic in the 
procedural dimension of impartiality is not problematic in the ethical 
dimension. As previously noted, across state and federal systems, 
disqualification is a matter of ethics and procedure.184 Even though 
procedural and ethical disqualification directives are essentially the 
same,185 the application of those directives is not. Whereas a judge is 
subject to disqualification in the procedural dimension when her 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, irrespective of the judge’s 
state of mind, she is subject to discipline in the ethical dimension only 
when non-disqualification is willful—that is, when she knew or should 
have known that disqualification was necessary.186 In the procedural 
dimension, parties are entitled to a fair process featuring an impartial 
judge, which is a goal that is compromised when the disqualification 
standard is met. A good judge likewise disqualifies herself when the 
disqualification standard is met, but good judges make honest 
mistakes—mistakes made all the more understandable by a separate 
ethical directive that admonishes judges to decide the cases they are 
assigned unless disqualification is required—out of respect for the 
administrative burdens that unnecessary disqualifications pose.187  
The conclusion that erroneous non-disqualification sometimes spells 
trouble in the procedural dimension before it does so in the ethical 
dimension is consonant with the more general principle that when 
judges make honest mistakes, the appropriate remedy is appeal, not 
discipline.188 To reverse judges for honest mistakes is salutary; to 
punish judges for honest mistakes threatens their decisional 
independence.189 Although state judges have an ethical duty to “uphold 
and apply the law,”190 errors are subject to reversal, not discipline, 
                                                                                                                     
 184. See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text. 
 185. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 455, with CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, 
CANON 3C (2011) (showing that rules are almost identical in many respects). 
 186. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 179, at 4-3 (“[A] judge will be subject to discipline (as 
distinct from reversal on appeal) for incorrectly failing to disqualify himself only where the 
failure was willful.”). 
 187. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.7 & cmt. 1 (directing that judges must “decide [all] 
matters assigned to the judge, except when disqualification is required,” because of “the burdens 
that may be imposed on a judge’s colleagues” by “unwarranted disqualification”).  
 188. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 179, at 1-11. 
 189. Id. at 2-4. 
 190. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.2. 
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unless the errors are so egregious or chronic as to manifest bad faith or 
incompetence.191 
Drilling the matter down to the bedrock, impartiality promotes good 
process in one dimension and good judges in the other. Incursions on 
perfect impartiality will be tolerable or not, depending on which 
objective is at issue and the constraints to which the applicable system 
of regulation is subject. In both dimensions, a judge is often exposed as 
partial through her speech or associations. In the procedural dimension, 
the speech and associations of a partial judge have consequences for the 
process: parties are entitled to disqualification or reversal. In the ethical 
dimension, such speech and associations have consequences for the 
judge, who is subject to discipline or (in state systems) removal. A core 
constraint on the regulation of judicial impartiality through codes of 
judicial conduct and disciplinary processes, then, is constitutional; 
codes of conduct seek to preserve impartiality by restricting judicial 
speech and expressive conduct, which judges and judicial candidates 
have sometimes challenged as a violation of their First Amendment 
rights.192  
When codes of conduct restrict judicial speech on the basis of its 
content, the restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny.193 While promoting 
judicial impartiality is recognized as a compelling state interest, in the 
aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, state and federal courts have looked more closely at 
whether code restrictions on judicial speech promote impartiality with 
sufficient precision. In White, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a rule 
in the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, derived from the 1972 
Model Code, which forbade judges and judicial candidates from 
announcing their views on issues that could come before them as 
judges, on the grounds that the rule did not further the purported goal of 
promoting judicial impartiality.194 In the aftermath of White, First 
Amendment challenges to code provisions that restrict speech for the 
sake of preserving judicial impartiality have continued apace. 
Uncertainty abounds. Some courts have invalidated rules that prohibited 
judges from pledging, promising, or committing to decide future cases 
in particular ways, while others have upheld them. Some courts have 
invalidated rules that prohibited judges from soliciting campaign 
contributions directly from donors, while others have upheld them. And 
                                                                                                                     
 191. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 179, at 2-4–2-15. In the federal system, the issue is 
resolved by the disciplinary statute itself, which directs chief judges to dismiss judicial conduct 
complaints that are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 352(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 192. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002). 
 193. Id. at 774.  
 194. Id. at 787–88. 
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some courts have invalidated rules that prohibited judges from engaging 
in partisan political activities of various kinds, while, yet again, others 
have upheld them.195 
In the ethical dimension, then, codes of judicial conduct sometimes 
regulate judicial partiality by prohibiting judicial speech, while in the 
procedural dimension, a judge’s speech is not prohibited, but the baleful 
effects of that speech on the parties’ rights to a fair hearing can be 
ameliorated by the judicial process. As a consequence, it may be 
problematic under the First Amendment to reprimand a judge for 
making statements to the detriment of her perceived impartiality, but not 
to disqualify her from a case for doing so. Litigants insensitive to this 
distinction between dimensions have argued that the First Amendment 
prohibits the disqualification of judges for announcing views they have 
a First Amendment right to express, and have convinced at least one 
court that they are right.196 More recently, however, the Supreme Court 
has ruled that the right of public officials to speak their minds does not 
subsume a right to act upon those views in their official capacity,197 
which should put this small piece of the larger dispute to rest. 
Regulatory structures in the procedural and ethical dimensions are 
routinely brought to bear against many of the chronic partiality 
problems described in Part I, but are ill-equipped to tackle more 
pervasive problems the public regards as systemic. Part of the difficulty 
lies in the piecemeal orientation of these mechanisms. Granting this 
litigant’s request for disqualification or disciplining that judge for an 
appearance of bias does little to allay entrenched suspicions that judges 
categorically are under the thrall of their political ideology, 
socioeconomic status, gender, or race. Rules of ethics categorically 
prohibit judges from becoming so enthralled,198 and rules of procedure 
subject individual judges to disqualification when it occurs.199 But the 
default position in the ethical and procedural dimensions is to presume 
that judges are impartial until that presumption is rebutted with 
demonstrable proof to the contrary. Moreover, rules of ethics and 
procedure are enforced against judges by other judges, which skeptical 
observers may regard as so many foxes guarding the henhouse. To 
address these more diffuse and systemic concerns for the benefit of a 
                                                                                                                     
 195. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Criticism and Speech of Judges in the United States, in 
JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 257, 271 & nn.52–58 (H.P. Lee ed., 2011) (citing 
and discussing cases).  
 196. See James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, An Announce Clause by Any Other 
Name: The Unconstitutionality of Disciplining Judges Who Fail to Disqualify Themselves for 
Exercising Their Freedom to Speak, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 723, 724 (2007); Duwe v. Alexander, 
490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2007). 
 197. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 1, 9 (2011). 
 198. See MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.2 cmt. 2. 
 199. FLAMM, supra note 9, at 274. 
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public whose confidence in the courts may swing in the balance, 
regulatory mechanisms in the procedural and ethical dimensions of 
impartiality are supplemented by an array of devices in the political 
dimension. 
C.  Regulating Judicial Impartiality in the Political Dimension 
The unifying feature of structures that regulate impartiality in the 
political dimension is that those structures are implemented by the 
public or the public’s elected representatives for the purpose of 
promoting the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy within the body 
politic. Such structures are logically subdivided into three categories: 
(1) mechanisms for judicial removal, (2) mechanisms for judicial 
selection, and (3) mechanisms for judicial oversight. These structures 
can be used to enhance the judiciary’s legitimacy in a variety of ways 
that include but are not limited to promoting public confidence in the 
judiciary’s impartiality. For example, judicial removal, selection, and 
oversight can also enhance the public’s faith in the courts by policing 
judicial honesty, integrity, competence, diligence, and temperament. 
The focus in this Section, however, is on the ways in which the political 
dimension regulates the four persistent partiality problem areas outlined 
in Part I.  
The political dimension is uniquely equipped to address partiality 
problems that citizens and their representatives regard as troublesome, 
but which judges—who oversee regulation in the procedural and ethical 
dimensions—do not, or which are otherwise ill-suited for remediation 
outside of the political dimension because of constraints under which 
regulation in other dimensions operate. Of particular relevance here are 
suspicions that broad segments of the judiciary are captured by their 
biases or political interests, which, despite being concerns of long 
standing, go largely unaddressed in litigation and disciplinary settings. 
With respect to the most publicized and pervasive of these public 
suspicions—that judges allow their ideological interests to subvert the 
rule of law—regulation in the political dimension manifests an inherent 
tension, in which one form of partiality is discouraged by encouraging 
another: public or political branch controls on judicial decision making 
seek to discourage judges from acting on their internal political interests 
in ways that could compromise their impartiality, and do so by 
encouraging judges to respond to political pressure and thereby act on 
their external political interests in ways that could compromise their 
impartiality. Insofar as regulation in this arena curtails one form of 
partiality by exacerbating another to the end of optimizing public 
confidence in the courts, delegating the task of striking the preferred 
balance to the public and its elected representatives (subject to the broad 
constitutional limits outlined below) has intuitive appeal.  
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This is, in effect, another way of framing the perpetual struggle 
between the decisional form of judicial independence and judicial 
accountability, which scholars (myself included) have explored 
elsewhere.200 There are, however, three reasons to recast this piece of 
the independence–accountability debate in terms of judicial impartiality. 
First, the harms that independence and accountability seek to prevent 
can fairly be characterized as forms of judicial partiality: independence 
aims to insulate judges from external threats or blandishments that 
could impair judges’ impartial judgment, while accountability aims to 
ensure that judges do not allow their internal biases to compromise their 
impartial judgment. Second, disputants in the independence–
accountability debate justify their positions in terms of the need for 
judicial impartiality: court defenders have objected that threats to 
remove judges on account of their decisions will undermine judicial 
impartiality;201 court critics have argued that thwarting Senate 
confirmation of “activist” judges is necessary to ensure that judges 
impartially uphold the law;202 and defenders and critics alike have 
rationalized their efforts to subject judges to or liberate judges from 
political branch controls in terms of the need to promote judicial 
impartiality.203 Third, situating the struggle between decisional 
independence and judicial accountability in a political dimension of 
impartiality makes it possible to analyze that struggle in a broader 
context that integrates procedure, ethics, and politics.   
1.  Mechanisms for Judicial Removal 
Removal mechanisms serve as a bridge between the ethical and 
political dimensions of impartiality. In the federal system, the sole 
                                                                                                                     
 200. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of 
Political Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 911, 915–17 (2006) (likening the relationship 
between judicial independence and accountability to that of yin and yang); Stephen B. Burbank, 
The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 339–40 (1999) (describing 
independence and accountability as different sides of the same coin).  
 201. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, In Rare Appearance, 2 Justices Concur in Threats to 
Neutrality, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1998, at A2 (“Several speakers in the weekend conference here 
said the overall trend [of proposing to impeach judges for their decisions] threatens the 
impartiality that is the hallmark of the courts and can lead judges to look over their shoulders.”). 
 202. Sean Lengell, Republican Filibuster Blocks Liu for Appeals Court, WASHINGTON 
TIMES, May 20, 2011, at A2 (explaining that Senate Republicans filibustered circuit court 
nominee Goodwin Liu because “Mr. Liu’s legal writings ‘reveal a left-wing ideologue who 
views the role of a judge not as that of an impartial arbiter, but as someone who views the bench 
as a position of power’”). 
 203. See, e.g., Editorial, Gingrich’s Threats Against Judges Go Way Beyond the Pale, 
U.S.A. TODAY, Dec. 20, 2011, at 10A (characterizing proposal to disestablish courts staffed by 
“activist” judges as antithetical to an impartial judiciary); Tom McClusky, Rein in Activist 
Judges, U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 2, 2006, at 8A (advocating various political branch controls on the 
judiciary to preserve impartiality and independence). 
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mechanism for judicial removal is the impeachment process.204 
Impeachment is situated in the political dimension, as I have defined it, 
by virtue of being a power within the sole authority of Congress to 
exercise for the redress of “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors”205—offenses The Federalist characterized as “political” 
in nature and constituting an “abuse or violation of some public 
trust.”206 Impeachment, however, is logically connected to the ethical 
dimension too, insofar as conduct that the judiciary deems bad enough 
to warrant discipline can be bad enough to undermine public trust and 
warrant impeachment. Accordingly, the ultimate disciplinary sanction 
that federal statute authorizes the judiciary to impose in the ethical 
dimension is to refer a matter to the House of Representatives for a 
possible impeachment inquiry in the political dimension.207  
Impeachable offenses do not always implicate judicial partiality—
Judge Harry Claiborne, for example, was impeached and removed for 
tax evasion,208 which impugned his integrity, but not necessarily his 
commitment to deciding cases without bias or prejudice (except, 
perhaps, tax evasion cases). Nevertheless, of the few judicial 
impeachments that have been prosecuted to conclusion, several have 
concerned judges who, returning to the typology detailed in Part I, 
allegedly had their impartiality compromised by personal or relational 
interests in matters that they decided.209 
In state systems, the primary mechanism for judicial removal is the 
disciplinary process.210 I have previously situated judicial discipline in 
the ethical dimension because it is the means by which judicial systems 
                                                                                                                     
 204. See Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A 
Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 213, 215–18, 220–22 (1993). 
 205. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 358 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott, ed.). 
 207. 28 U.S.C. § 351 et seq. (2006). 
 208. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 36, at 168–69 (1999). 
 209. Judges impeached for personal interests include Judges Robert Archbald, who was 
impeached and removed for cultivating business relationships with prospective litigants. 
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 
OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 150 (2006) [hereinafter GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS 
COLLIDE]. Alcee Hastings was impeached and removed for soliciting a bribe. EMILY FIELD VAN 
TASSEL, WHY JUDGES RESIGN: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL SERVICE 1789 TO 1992 81 
(1993) [hereinafter VAN TASSEL, WHY JUDGES RESIGN]. G. Thomas Porteous was impeached 
and removed for soliciting payment from a lawyer in a pending case. CQ WEEKLY, supra note 
37. Judges impeached for relational interests include Walter Nixon, who was impeached and 
removed for perjury after falsely denying that he intervened on a friend’s behalf to secure the 
dismissal of a case. VAN TASSEL, WHY JUDGES RESIGN, supra, at 101. Halsted Ritter was 
impeached, but removed on an omnibus count, for awarding excessive sums to a law partner. 
GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra, at 151. And George English was impeached 
and then resigned for, among other things, securing a position for his son with a bank holding 
bankruptcy funds under the judge’s control. Id. at 150–51. 
 210. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 179, at 15-1. 
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enforce codes of judicial conduct to the end of calling judges to task for 
bad behavior that subsumes various forms of partiality. Self-policing in 
this way can simultaneously promote public confidence in the courts, 
but other mechanisms for judicial removal are more clearly 
denominated political because they are controlled by non-judicial 
actors. In addition to impeachment processes, various states employ 
such removal mechanisms as: the legislative address, which authorizes 
the legislature to seek the removal of a judge by petitioning the 
governor; automatic removal of a judge upon conviction of specified 
crimes, which gives the executive branch a role to play in judicial 
removal through criminal prosecution; and judicial recall, in which the 
electorate is enabled to seek the removal of a judge in special 
elections.211  
Mechanisms for judicial removal in the political dimension operate 
under the constraint of being cumbrous by constitutional design; these 
mechanisms authorize political branch encroachments on the tenure, 
and hence the autonomy, of the judiciary, and their unwieldiness 
operates as a check against overuse.212 For example, removal by 
impeachment in the federal system and in most states requires an 
impeachment upon a majority vote by one chamber of the legislature 
followed by a trial and conviction upon a supermajority vote in the 
other chamber.213 As a consequence, to the extent that impeachment has 
been brought to bear as a remedy for judicial partiality, it has been 
reserved for egregious personal or relational conflicts on the order of 
corruption or indictable crimes.214 In contrast, efforts to characterize 
highhanded decision making as an impeachable usurpation of power in 
which the judge’s duty to impartially uphold the law is compromised by 
personal or political zeal have chronically failed.215  
The role that these removal mechanisms play in policing judicial 
conduct and promoting public confidence in the impartiality of the 
judiciary, however, is not necessarily limited to those few cases in 
which judges are removed by such mechanisms. When a judge is 
threatened with impeachment, recall, or removal by legislative address, 
it underscores the seriousness of the speaker’s concern and calls public 
                                                                                                                     
 211. Id. at 15-1, 15-5, 15-9–15-12, 15-14–15-15. 
 212. Id. at 15-1–15-2. 
 213. Randy J. Holland & Cynthia Gray, Judicial Discipline: Independence with 
Accountability, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 117, 121 (2000). 
 214. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 36, at 5–6, 13. 
 215. Since 1787, the House of Representatives has investigated at least thirty-two judges 
for high-handed decision making. GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 209, 
at 119. Of those, four were impeached but only one, John Pickering, was removed. Id. at 125. 
Pickering’s conviction is attributed largely to the judge’s insanity, not his decision making. VAN 
TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 36, at 92 (“[H]is manifest disability undercut the precedential 
value his removal had for establishing the validity of the Jeffersonian theory of impeachment.”). 
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attention to the underlying partiality problem.216 Moreover, the threat 
itself can chasten the judge in subtle and sometimes not so subtle ways. 
For example, in 1996, United States District Judge Harold Baer 
reversed his decision to suppress evidence in a drug case after being 
threatened with impeachment for what House and Senate leaders 
characterized as an “activist” ruling.217 In 2003, a Massachusetts 
superior court judge resigned after a bill of legislative address was filed 
because of a sentence she imposed in a kidnapping case.218 That same 
year the Nevada chief justice survived a recall election over her decision 
in a tax case, but resigned at the end of her term.219 Finally, recourse to 
these mechanisms, even if only as a rhetorical device, offers court 
critics an opportunity to target more categorical partiality problems. At 
the start of the nineteenth century, for example, newly elected 
Jeffersonian Republicans in Congress actively pursued impeachment as 
a means to purge the judiciary of what they regarded as excessively 
partisan judges appointed by the predecessor Federalist regime.220 
Nearly two centuries later, newly elected congressional Republicans 
proposed a campaign to impeach “liberal judicial activist[]” judges 
appointed by prior administrations.221 In this way, the threat of removal 
has been used to address more systemic concerns that judicial 
impartiality has been compromised by partisan, political interests.  
2.  Mechanisms for Judicial Selection 
In state systems, judges are selected by at least five different means, 
involving various combinations of governors, commissions, legislatures, 
and voters.222 Each of these participants can have a role to play in 
evaluating a judicial candidate’s past or prospective impartiality as one 
issue among many in judicial selection. As a practical matter, however, 
                                                                                                                     
 216. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Choreography of Courts-Congress Conflicts, in THE 
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC 19, 32–33 (Bruce 
Peobody ed., 2011). 
 217. Don Van Natta, Jr., A Publicized Drug Courier Pleads Guilty to 3 Felonies, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 1996, at 23. 
 218. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 179, at 15-10. 
 219. See id. at 15-14. 
 220. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 36, at 91 (discussing Jeffersonian 
Republicans’ campaign to remove “all of [the judges] . . . indiscriminately”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 221. GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 209, at 3. 
 222. The five systems include: gubernatorial appointment; gubernatorial appointment from 
a candidate pool selected by a judicial nominating commission (“merit selection”), typically 
followed by periodic retention elections; partisan election; nonpartisan election; and legislative 
appointment. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why it 
Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1263 (2008) [hereinafter 
Geyh, Endless Judicial Selection Debate]. For a summary of which states use what selection 
methods, see http://www.judicialselection.us. 
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the choices that governors and commissions make to exclude particular 
judicial candidates are largely inscrutable, and legislatures have primary 
responsibility for judicial selection in only two states.223 That leaves 
voters, and because 80% of state judges stand for judicial elections of 
some sort,224 the role that elections play in policing judicial impartiality 
is the focus here.  
Elections have one foot in judicial selection and the other in judicial 
removal: in states with contested elections, the net effect of selecting a 
challenger over an incumbent is to remove the incumbent from office; 
in states with retention elections, the public’s role in judicial selection is 
limited to deciding whether an incumbent should be removed to make 
way for a new appointment. Either way, elections serve as a means to 
police judicial impartiality. For example, candidates have been called to 
task for their personal interest in making decisions that accommodate 
the preferences of their campaign contributors,225 or for their relational 
interest in presiding over cases in which the judge’s relatives had an 
interest.226 Perhaps the most common partiality problem to surface in 
recent judicial campaigns concerns claims that candidates have internal 
political interests in the issues they will decide as judges that may trump 
their commitment to follow the law. Examples abound in which judicial 
candidates have been portrayed by their opponents as activists whose 
commitment to impartially uphold the rule of law is compromised by 
their ideological biases on such matters as same-sex marriage, the death 
penalty, abortion, water rights, and tort reform.227  
It is, of course, possible for judicial candidates to have principled 
disagreements over the interpretation of constitutions and statutes or the 
direction of the common law without implicating the impartiality of 
either candidate. Moreover, serious scholars of judicial behavior have 
refuted the premise that the rulings judges make are the product of 
binary choices between law and politics.228 In the political dimension of 
                                                                                                                     
 223. Geyh, Endless Judicial Selection Debate, supra note 222, at 1263. 
 224. ABA, PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 1 (2002). 
 225. See Toby Coleman, Massey CEO Gives $1.7 Million to Anti-Warren McGraw Group, 
W. VA. CITIZEN ACTION GRP. (Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.wvcag.org/news/fair_use/2004/10_15 
a.htm. 
 226. In a 2007 Wisconsin Supreme Court race, candidate Annette Ziegler was accused (as a 
court of appeals judge) of presiding over cases in which her husband was affiliated with a 
corporate party. See Viveca Novak & Emi Kolawole, Warring Ads in Wisconsin Supreme Court 
Race: Ziegler and Clifford Sling Mud in the Dairy State, FACTCHECK.ORG (Mar. 30, 2007),  
http://www.factcheck.org/judicial-campaigns/warring_ads_in_wisconsin_supreme_court_race.h 
tml.  
 227. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Criticism and Speech of Judges in the United States, in 
JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE supra note 57, at 265–66. 
 228. Lawrence Baum, Law and Policy: More and Less than a Dichotomy, in WHAT’S LAW 
GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE, supra note 
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impartiality, however, dichotomous debates over the “activist” 
motivations of judicial candidates are a prominent feature of the 
landscape in judicial campaigns.229 If a campaign becomes a 
referendum on which candidate (or whether a given candidate) is 
committed to impartially upholding the law in light of her views on 
issue X, then it follows logically that the choices voters make in that 
election can promote public confidence in the impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
The primary constraint on the capacity of elections to police 
impartiality concerns the tension alluded to earlier: to the extent that 
elections promote public confidence in an impartial judiciary by 
reassuring voters that judges selected will impartially uphold the law as 
voters understand it, elections do so by means that arguably undermine 
judicial impartiality in other respects. First, the prospect of electoral 
defeat is an external interest that can—and in the minds of ardent 
judicial election proponents, should—influence the judge’s assessment 
of the law and facts, to the detriment of the judge’s independence and 
impartiality. Second, competitive elections are fueled by campaign 
expenditures that create the perception that judges have a personal 
financial interest in aligning their decisions with contributor 
preferences. While worries about unaccountable judges run amok have 
stalled a mid-twentieth century movement among the states to end 
contested judicial elections,230 worries about elections run amok have 
thwarted any movement in the opposite direction.231 Moreover, in 
heated election campaigns where each side accuses the other of 
sponsoring an ideological zealot, the conclusion that the electoral 
process promotes public confidence in the impartiality of the judges 
selected may be optimistic.232 
                                                                                                                     
98, at 71 (arguing that the law–policy dichotomy “oversimplifies the reality of judging”); Frank 
Cross, Law is Politics, in id. at 92, 110 (arguing that the “complementary effect” of law and 
politics on judicial decision making is “the strength of our judicial system”). 
 229. Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive?, supra note 59, at 216–17. 
 230. Geyh, Endless Judicial Selection Debate, supra note 222, at 1262 (noting that “the 
merit selection movement has stalled”).  
 231. Campaigns have been launched in several states to replace merit selection systems 
with contested elections. See id. To date, however, those efforts have failed. See History of 
Reform Efforts: Unsuccessful Reform Efforts, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselect 
ion.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/failed_reform_efforts.cfm?state= (last visited Dec. 18, 
2012); Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Selection Reconsidered: A Plea for Radical Moderation, 
35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 623, 630–31 (arguing for incremental reform of judicial selection 
“[w]hen, as now, the latest movement has run its course and the political will for fundamental 
change is absent”). 
 232. Survey research suggests that contested elections foster general public support for the 
courts.  See JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING ON 
JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY 146–48 (2012). That, however, is an issue distinct from whether elections 
engender confidence in the impartiality of the judges so selected. 
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In the federal system, presidents often identify impartiality as a 
quality they seek when choosing judicial nominees, while senators 
rationalize their roles in confirmation proceedings in terms of assuring 
that judges confirmed will impartially uphold the law.233 The Senate has 
rejected nominees who exhibited financial interests in the cases they 
decided, the most notable example being President Richard Nixon’s 
failed Supreme Court nomination of Judge Clement Haynsworth, who 
was voted down in part for presiding over cases in which he held stock 
in corporate parties.234 Relational interests have been at issue with 
nominees portrayed as cronies of the president—President George W. 
Bush’s aborted Supreme Court nomination of his counsel, Harriet 
Miers, being a recent example.235  
Bias too has arisen as an issue: President Nixon’s nomination of 
Judge G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court was rejected, in part, 
for evidence of racism.236 Conversely, President Jimmy Carter launched 
a campaign to improve the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy by 
diversifying the ranks of the district courts with more women and racial 
minorities.237 There are two data points that suggest the possibility of a 
relationship between such diversification efforts and the judiciary’s 
impartiality in the political dimension. First, the perceived impartiality 
of a largely white judiciary is much lower among African-Americans 
than white Americans.238 Second, a judge’s race and gender inform 
perspectives that influence outcomes in cases of special relevance to 
members of the affected gender or race.239 Paradoxically, to 
acknowledge this relationship openly is to risk overstating it, if the ideal 
of an impartial judge is one impervious to extralegal influences; witness 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation struggle in the wake of 
statements she made that a “wise Latina judge” might decide cases 
differently, and better, than a white male counterpart.240 And so, as 
Professor Martha Minow has explained, claims that judges and the 
                                                                                                                     
 233. See Davis, supra note 85. 
 234. Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
736, 736 & n.2 (1973).  
 235. GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 209, at 206. 
 236. See id. at 203. 
 237. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM 
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 243–44 (1997). 
 238. See DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PERCEPTIONS OF THE 
COURTS IN YOUR COMMUNITY: THE INFLUENCE OF EXPERIENCE, RACE AND ETHNICITY, FINAL 
REPORT 10 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/201302.pdf. 
 239. See Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of 
Iqbal’s Effect On Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 60–61 (2011); 
Edward A. Adams, Race & Gender of Judges Make Enormous Difference in Rulings, Studies 
Find, A.B.A.J., Feb. 6, 2010. 
 240. Davis, supra note 85. 
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judiciary are “enriched” by the diversity of experience that comes from 
racial, ethnic, and gender differences are countered by claims that a 
judge should be “stripped down like a runner” who sheds the biases of 
his race and gender like so much clothing.241 
As with elections in state systems, however, the federal appointment 
process recently fixated on partiality manifested by the ideological 
orientation of judicial nominees, to the end of purging the judiciary of 
“activists” or “extremists,” whose internal political interests in case 
outcomes compromise their allegiance to the rule of law.242 And as with 
state judicial election campaigns, the campaign against activism waged 
in confirmation proceedings has transcended attacks on individual 
nominees and acquired a systemic focus, by seeking to ameliorate a 
more pervasive suspicion that judges generally capitulate to their 
ideological biases.243 Moreover, the countervailing concern is likewise 
the same: the confirmation process, like the electoral process, is 
ostensibly aimed at preserving public confidence in the judges so 
selected, but may—through highly partisan attacks impugning the 
impartiality of nominees from presidents of both parties—damage the 
judiciary’s perceived legitimacy.244 
From the perspective of social science, the “judicial activist” 
bogeyman is a cartoonish distortion of reality. The adversarial process 
presupposes that there is always more than one way to look at difficult 
legal and factual questions. When the answers to such questions are 
unclear, honorable judges must, of necessity, exercise discretion—
discretion that is informed by their life experience. And the data show 
that such discretion can be influenced by a variety of factors, including 
ideology, race, gender, and others.245 Campaigns to purge judicial 
decision making of ideological influences are thus misinformed or 
disingenuous. More reasonably conceived, such campaigns seek to 
ensure that ideological influences on the exercise of judicial discretion 
will fall within a politically acceptable range. To that extent, selection 
processes are aimed at producing judges who will be impartial enough 
to retain public support—and consistent with that objective, survey data 
in state and federal systems show that public support for the courts 
remains relatively strong.246 
                                                                                                                     
 241. Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and 
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1992). 
 242. See GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 209, at 214–21. 
 243. See id. 
 244. See Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive?, supra note 59, at 232.  
 245. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 246. See Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, in WHAT’S 
LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE, supra 
note 98, at 306, 310–11. 
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3.  Mechanisms for Judicial Oversight 
In the state and federal systems, legislatures have varying degrees of 
regulatory authority over judicial pay raises, court structure, 
jurisdiction, budgets, administration, and procedure.247 These tools can 
afford the political branches a role to play in the procedural and ethical 
dimensions of impartiality. For example, in the federal system, 
Congress has enacted legislation governing disqualification248 and 
procedural rulemaking,249 which structures the manner in which courts 
regulate impartiality in the procedural dimension. And Congress has 
also enacted the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act,250 which is a 
means by which the federal judiciary manages impartiality in the ethical 
dimension.251  
At their core, however, mechanisms for legislative oversight of the 
courts are centered in the political dimension—mechanisms that can be 
employed, or at least purportedly employed, for the purpose of 
promoting public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. 
Congress, by virtue of its power to establish inferior courts, has broad 
regulatory authority over the lower courts.252 To guard against 
perceived partiality by state judges against out-of-state litigants, 
Congress has, since 1789, authorized lower federal courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over cases arising between citizens of different states,253 and 
more recently has expanded diversity jurisdiction to provide defendants 
greater access to federal forums in class actions.254 In 1891, Congress 
established the circuit courts of appeals to control what congressional 
committee reports characterized as district court “despotism,” that is, 
unchecked judicial partiality toward personal or internal political 
interests that impeded the rule of law.255 Legislation that limits 
sentencing discretion—statutory minimums, maximums, and sentencing 
guidelines, for example—curtails the authority of judges to act on their 
                                                                                                                     
247. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Elastic Nature of Judicial Independence and Judicial 
Accountability, in THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 167, 168–71 (Gordon 
M. Griller & E. Keith Stott, Jr. eds., ABA Press 7th ed. 2002) [hereinafter Geyh, The Elastic 
Nature of Judicial Independence]. 
 248. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006). 
 249. Id. §§ 2071–77. 
 250. Id. §§ 351–64. 
 251. See id. 
 252. Geyh, The Elastic Nature of Judicial Independence, supra note 247, at 168–69. 
 253. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
 254. Id. § 1332(d). 
 255. JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 50-942, at 3–4 
(1888), reprinted in 3 CONGRESS AND THE COURTS: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1787–1977, 4543, 
4545–46 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & Charles R. Haworth eds., 1978); Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 
517, 26 Stat. 826. 
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ideological prejudices.256 And the campaign against judicial activism, 
which Republican presidential candidates sought to revitalize in the 
2012 presidential campaign, has included proposals to discourage 
partiality toward judges’ internal political interests by disestablishing or 
cutting the budgets of uncooperative courts, freezing judicial salaries, 
and depriving judges of jurisdiction to hear controversial cases.257 Many 
state legislatures have undertaken to regulate their respective judiciaries 
in similar ways toward similar ends by manipulating judicial salaries 
and budgets and proposing to curtail subject matter jurisdiction and 
judicial review.258  
The authority of legislatures to regulate judicial impartiality through 
oversight is subject to constitutional and normative constraints. As to 
constitutional constraints, Article III limits legislative control over 
judicial tenure and salaries, and the judiciary’s exclusive constitutional 
authority to exercise judicial power bars Congress from overturning 
judgments by legislation.259 Congress’s authority to establish (and by 
negative implication disestablish) the lower courts does not extend to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, where congressional authority is limited to 
making regulations and exceptions incident to the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction260 and exercising whatever additional powers are implied by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.261 Many state constitutions grant their 
judicial systems greater institutional separation and independence than 
their federal counterpart, which can further limit legislatures’ regulatory 
authority over state court operations.262 As to normative constraints, I 
have argued elsewhere that over the course of the nineteenth century, 
Congress gradually internalized judicial independence norms that 
constrained its political will to control judges and their decision making 
to the full extent authorized by the U.S. Constitution.263 The net effect 
was to render less viable tools seemingly at Congress’s disposal to 
chasten judges whose internal political interests in the outcomes of 
cases they decided compromised their impartiality.264  
                                                                                                                     
 256. See GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 209, at 268–69. 
 257. Id. at 3–4. 
 258. Emily Field Van Tassel, Challenges to Constitutional Decisions of State Courts and 
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IV.  PONDERING IMPONDERABLES AND TRACKING TRENDS 
Professors Stephen Burbank and Barry Friedman reconceptualized 
judicial independence with the insight that the judiciary’s independence 
is not monolithic; it has different forms, different meanings, and 
different applications in different contexts.265 The same may be said of 
judicial impartiality. Describing judicial impartiality in terms of its 
procedural, ethical, and political dimensions—each with distinct 
schemas for regulation that vary across and within jurisdictions—
illuminates the relationship between judicial process, ethics, and politics 
and reveals an architecture for conceptualizing impartiality that solves 
some of the puzzles introduced in this Article. 
A.  The Imponderables Revisited 
This Article began with Lillian Hellman’s observation that 
“[n]obody outside of a baby carriage or a Judge’s chamber can believe 
in an unprejudiced point of view.”266 Putting the infants to one side (or 
at least down for a nap), judges may well “believe” themselves 
unprejudiced. After all, judges “persistently and adamantly deny that 
their fact-finding or legal interpretations are motivated by their 
personal . . . preferences.”267 Moreover, even if judges are influenced 
by their prejudices, cognitive psychology offers an explanation, 
traveling under the name “motivated reasoning,” for why judges may be 
sincere in their belief that they are not so influenced.268 After two 
millennia of evidence to the contrary, however, it is too late in the day 
to make categorical claims that judges are literally impartial in the sense 
of being devoid of prejudice or bias. Hellman made her observation in a 
book review: unlike fiction writers, she explained, “the historian or 
biographer . . . must make sure . . . that the people he is writing about 
                                                                                                                     
 265. See Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROOSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 9, 16–22 
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are not the victims of his loving or unloving heart.”269 Thus, even if it is 
impossible to have an unprejudiced point of view, she concluded, 
“simply in self-interest, the biographer must try for one.”270 Perhaps the 
same may be said of judges: even if a completely impartial perspective 
is unattainable, we must still insist that judges—aided by those who 
oversee judicial systems—“try for one.” In short, perfect impartiality 
remains the ideal, while “impartial enough” is the pragmatic objective. 
That objective is dimension-dependent, in that the impartiality needed 
to give parties an acceptably fair hearing can differ from that needed to 
ensure an acceptably ethical judge, which, in turn, can differ from the 
impartiality necessary to preserve an acceptable degree of public 
confidence in the judiciary. 
Once the inevitability of imperfect impartiality is acknowledged, it 
becomes possible to unpack the quandary presented by Judge Walker 
deciding the same-sex marriage case. Insofar as Judge Walker’s 
perspective is informed by his experience as a homosexual, the same 
can be said of the heterosexual judge. To the extent that these 
differences in perspective are characterized as forms of bias that can 
influence a judge’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in the 
context of a gay marriage case, they are ubiquitous. And in the 
procedural dimension of impartiality, which is constrained by the need 
for an ample supply of judges to decide cases, universal disqualification 
would be impracticable. Whether a judge is gay or straight, Christian or 
Jewish, male or female, black or white, may well exert a more 
significant extralegal influence on judicial decision making in certain 
kinds of cases than, say, whether the judge owns a few shares of stock 
in a corporate party. But from a practical perspective, disqualification 
procedure depends on more or less bright lines and limited applications. 
Hence, disqualification for stock ownership presents a manageable 
disqualification rule, while disqualification for affiliation with a given 
race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation—absent specific statements 
or conduct indicative of bias in a particular case—does not. Moreover, 
absent such particularized evidence of bias, the right of parties to an 
impartial hearing in the procedural dimension is not compromised but 
arguably furthered by the diversity of perspective that comes from 
judges with varying backgrounds. If one accepts the premise that there 
is often no one “correct” answer to many of the difficult questions 
judges decide, and that the exercise of discretion is therefore inevitable, 
then as long as a judge’s race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation 
informs her discretion without overriding her commitment to follow the 
law, diversity of perspective can level the ideological playing field for 
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litigants. 
Judge Pickering’s scenario addresses the flip side of the same coin. 
A judge’s political ideology may influence her decision making to an 
even greater extent than her race or gender, but like the influence of 
gender or race, ideology furnishes neither a necessary nor manageable 
basis for disqualification in the procedural dimension.271 The political 
dimension, in contrast, is unencumbered by the same constraints and is 
less concerned with ensuring litigants a fair hearing than it is with 
preserving the public’s confidence in the impartiality of its judiciary. 
Hence, the Senate may challenge the impartiality of nominees in light of 
racial, gender, or ideological biases that would not call the judge’s 
impartiality into question in disqualification proceedings.272 For 
example, it is difficult to imagine that Justice Sotomayor could be 
disqualified from race and gender discrimination cases on the grounds 
that her impartiality might reasonably be questioned because she once 
said that her status as a Latina woman influences her decision 
making.273 And yet, in confirmation proceedings, the Senate devoted 
considerable attention to whether that very statement would undermine 
public confidence in her impartiality to an unacceptable degree.274 The 
same point can be made of Judge Pickering: ideological predilections 
that would have little bearing on Judge Pickering’s impartiality in a 
disqualification setting nonetheless called his impartiality into question 
during his Senate confirmation proceedings.275 
The Senate’s rejection of Judge Pickering’s nomination to the Fifth 
Circuit underscores how much ideological orientation has to do with a 
judge’s impartiality in the political dimension, where a nominee’s 
commitment to impartially uphold the law is measured with reference to 
whether the judge’s views on legal issues are politically acceptable. In 
that setting, the judge who shares her views risks undermining her 
perceived impartiality with the public and being rejected by the Senate 
for that reason. It is thus understandable that as a nominee Judge Scalia 
declined to take public positions on issues he was likely to decide as a 
Justice, on the grounds that doing so could compromise his 
impartiality.276 Conversely, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White,277 when Justice Scalia opined on behalf of the Court that a 
judge’s predilections on questions of law had nothing to do with his 
impartiality, he did so in a case that fell squarely within the ethical 
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dimension of impartiality.278 At issue was whether the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s interest in preserving impartiality by disciplining 
judicial candidates who announced their preexisting legal views 
trumped the candidates’ First Amendment freedom of speech.279 In that 
setting, Justice Scalia approved one definition of impartiality (lack of 
bias for or against a party) and possibly a second (open-mindedness), 
but explicitly rejected a third: “lack of preconception in favor of or 
against a particular legal view.”280 With respect to the latter, the Court 
explained that preexisting views on legal questions were indicative of a 
good and learned judge, not a partial one.281 The Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s ultimate argument was, in effect, that a good judge is an 
impartial judge is an open-minded judge, and that candidates who 
announce their views compromise their open-mindedness—an argument 
the Court rejected on the grounds that the announce clause did not 
further the state’s purported interest in an impartial, open-minded 
judiciary.282  
Put another way, in the ethical dimension, declining to share one’s 
thoughts on legal questions during judicial campaigns is not a defining 
feature of an impartial qua ethical judge. It may, however, remain an 
issue for an impartial qua fair judge in the procedural dimension, insofar 
as judges who share their views in ways that appear to pre-commit them 
to decide future issues in specified ways may be subject to 
disqualification.283 And in the political dimension, declining to share 
one’s views can be a near-prerequisite for an impartial qua politically 
acceptable judge. The problem in the political dimension is not that 
judges who announce their views appear closed-minded to Senators in 
confirmation proceedings or to voters in judicial elections—although 
judges who decline to express their views often worry aloud that they 
do not want to compromise their impartiality in the procedural 
dimension by appearing to pre-commit themselves before parties have 
an opportunity to be heard.284 The core problem in the political 
dimension is that the substance of a judicial candidate’s views is fodder 
for campaigns that attack the candidates as activist or excessive in ways 
that belie the candidate’s commitment to impartially upholding the law. 
And so, Judge Scalia kept his counsel during confirmation proceedings, 
and incumbent state judges likewise decline overtures to announce their 
views in judicial campaigns, notwithstanding their First Amendment 
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right to do otherwise.285 
Which brings us to the problem presented by Twombly286 and 
Iqbal,287 in which the Supreme Court has reinvigorated the pleading 
process by subjecting complaints to dismissal if they do not allege a 
plausible claim—an assessment that the Court has instructed judges to 
make with reference to their “common sense” and “experience.”288 By 
encouraging judges to make plausibility assessments prior to discovery, 
the Court has weakened a procedural impediment to premature 
judgment. Insofar as plausibility  “may lie in the eye of the beholder,”289 
the new standard invites judges to act on their predispositions to the 
detriment of their impartiality. For example, one recent study confirmed 
that there has been a statistically significant change in dismissal rates in 
black plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination post-Iqbal.290  
The debate over pleading standards turns on the question of whether 
the costs and delays of discovery—constraints under which impartiality 
is regulated in the procedural dimension—trump the benefits of 
protracting the litigation process to better guard against prejudgment 
and the perils of judges bringing their prejudices into play at the outset 
of the litigation. In Twombly and Iqbal, the Court answered that 
question in the affirmative. The implication underlying these decisions 
is not that impartiality is expendable, but that it is expensive, and that a 
pleading standard that tolerates a bit more prejudgment in exchange for 
a bit less cost and delay yields a process that is “impartial enough” for 
the procedural dimension. 
B.  Trends in the Regulation of Impartiality 
The relevance of Twombly and Iqbal is not limited to their use as a 
foil for understanding how impartiality is regulated in the procedural 
dimension. Anger over those decisions piqued congressional interest, a 
development that is representative of a larger trend. When recent events 
in the regulation of impartiality are compartmentalized into their 
applicable dimensions, a pattern emerges that reveals a gradual 
movement away from regulation in the procedural and ethical 
dimensions toward regulation in the political dimension.  
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Returning briefly to Twombly and Iqbal, two consequences followed 
naturally from the Supreme Court’s decisions. First, by changing the 
pleading standards on its own, the Court effectively foreclosed 
resolution of the question in the procedural dimension by means of the 
largely intra-judicial Rules Enabling Act.291 That is so because, as a 
practical matter, it is unlikely that the Judicial Conference would 
challenge the conclusion of its presiding officer, the Chief Justice (who 
voted with the majority in both cases),292 and nullify Twombly and Iqbal 
by promulgating a new rule that could only become effective with the 
approval of the Supreme Court—the Supreme Court that authored the 
cases the new rule would overturn.293 As a consequence, the question of 
pleading standards reform in the aftermath of Twombly and Iqbal has 
moved to Congress in the political dimension, where it has become a 
hotly contested issue.294 Second, by giving district judges greater 
latitude to dismiss complaints they deem “implausible” on the basis of 
their “common sense,” the Court has increased the discretion of judges 
to act upon their predilections in ways that invite more sustained inquiry 
into such questions during confirmation proceedings. To date, district 
judges have largely avoided the highly politicized confirmation 
showdowns that have plagued Supreme Court and circuit court 
nominees.295 To the extent that “plausibility” is in the eye of the 
beholder, however, it may only be a matter of time before the “common 
sense” of district court nominees is tested in the appointments crucible.  
A comparable movement from the procedural to the political 
dimensions has occurred in the disqualification arena. An ironic 
impediment to regulating impartiality through rigorous enforcement of 
disqualification rules in the procedural dimension is that the procedures 
courts typically follow to implement those rules can compromise the 
perceived impartiality that disqualification rules seek to promote. In the 
federal system, and in many states, judges whose disqualification is 
sought decide the matter for themselves.296 Appellate review is 
available, but, with rare exception, appellate courts employ a highly 
deferential standard of review,297 which proceeds from the dubious 
premise that when deciding whether a judge is or appears to be too 
biased to hear a matter, we should defer to the assessment of the judge 
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who allegedly is or appears to be too biased to hear the matter.298 
Moreover, on courts of last resort, judges typically have the first and 
final word on their own qualifications to sit, and may err on the side of 
non-disqualification if there is no means to replace them when they 
withdraw.299 Insofar as being impartial is a defining feature of the 
“good” judge in the ethical dimension, judges who implement 
disqualification rules in the procedural dimension would seem to have a 
personal interest in the outcomes of challenges to their own impartiality. 
As a consequence, many lawyers have long been reluctant to seek 
disqualification of judges, who are unlikely to second-guess their own 
impartiality and who may take umbrage at the suggestion that their 
impartiality is in doubt.300 
For their part, judges have pushed back against efforts to reform 
disqualification procedure, arguing that such reforms are unnecessary 
and burdensome—core efficiency concerns that constrain the regulation 
of impartiality in the procedural dimension.301 In 2007, the American 
Bar Association (ABA) launched the Judicial Disqualification Project, 
which was aimed at “taking [judicial] disqualification seriously.”302 The 
Project’s 2008 preliminary report proposed six specific reforms to 
“diminish or eliminate the need for targeted judges to rule on motions 
for their own disqualification.”303 Two draft resolutions followed that 
sought to implement the recommendations of the draft report,304 but 
were withdrawn following objections from the ABA’s Judicial Division, 
among other ABA entities.305 A third resolution proposed simply that 
“each state should have in place clearly articulated procedures . . . for 
the handling of disqualification determinations” that “should be 
designed to produce resolution of disqualification issues that are both 
prompt and meaningful.”306 Even that, however, drew Judicial Division 
fire,307 and the call for prompt and meaningful determinations was 
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replaced by a fourth resolution, which the ABA ultimately adopted, for 
“prompt review by another judge or tribunal, or as otherwise provided 
by law or rule of court, of denials of requests to disqualify a judge”308—
which, given the universal availability of appellate review could fairly 
be characterized as endorsing the status quo.  
With efforts to reinvigorate the administration of disqualification 
rules in the procedural dimension languishing, activity in the political 
dimension has filled the void. The House Judiciary Committee held 
hearings on judicial disqualification in 2009 that focused on 
disqualification procedure.309 A 2009 survey found that over 80% of the 
public thought that disqualification requests should be decided by a 
different judge than the one whose disqualification is sought.310 Interest 
groups and the media have tapped into the public’s skepticism of 
judicial self-disqualification with several highly publicized campaigns 
to pressure Supreme Court Justices into recusing themselves in high-
profile cases. Calls for Justice Scalia’s disqualification in the duck 
hunting imbroglio of 2004 were followed by campaigns to disqualify 
Justices Thomas and Elena Kagan from participating in a case 
challenging the constitutionality of health care legislation, because of 
alleged conflicts attributable to the activities of Justice Thomas’s spouse 
on behalf of organizations opposed to the legislation, and Justice 
Kagan’s role in the development of the legislation while Solicitor 
General for the Obama Administration. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen 
Breyer announced his view that disqualification concerns were 
overblown and that the disqualification of Justice Thomas presented a 
“false issue.”311 As previously noted, there are longstanding ethical 
directives against judges making public statements on pending or 
impending cases.312 That Justice Breyer saw fit to make such statements 
here simultaneously underscores the diminished status of 
disqualification relative to other issues in the legal process, and the 
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elevated status of disqualification in the political process. 
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co.313 revitalized impartiality in the procedural dimension by 
characterizing non-disqualification in the teeth of probable bias as a 
Due Process Clause violation.314 The impact of Caperton, however, is 
sharply limited by the constraints under which the Due Process Clause 
regulates judicial impartiality.315 As previously explained, such 
constraints relegate due process challenges to the status of a last resort 
reserved for nippy days in hell.316 The Caperton majority emphasized 
that non-disqualification will violate due process only in outlier cases, 
when judges exhibit a flagrant probability of bias that inexplicably 
manages to evade capture by standard disqualification rules—rules that 
require recusal whenever a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.317 In short, the impact of Caperton is likely to be largely 
symbolic. 
There is likewise evidence of a gradual movement away from 
regulation of impartiality in the ethical dimension and toward 
heightened interest in the political dimension. A primary constraint on 
the robust operation of disciplinary mechanisms in the ethical 
dimension is that those mechanisms are implemented by and for judges 
who are predisposed to presume themselves impartial.318 In the federal 
system, that constraint has rendered the lower federal courts susceptible 
to criticism that the disciplinary process is underenforced and that the 
Code is underutilized.319 Such criticism has piqued congressional 
interest, thereby shifting the locus of attention to the political 
dimension. Thus, in response to the latest wave of concern, the House 
held oversight hearings on the disciplinary process;320 members of 
Congress investigated the conduct of judges whose disciplinary 
proceedings have stalled,321 with an eye toward possible impeachment; 
the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee introduced legislation to 
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establish an inspector general to investigate disciplinary complaints 
against judges;322 and Senators, frustrated by the Judicial Conference’s 
failure to regulate the ethics of judges attending educational seminars at 
vacation resorts, underwritten by corporations interested in the 
outcomes of cases those judges decided, introduced bills to ban “junkets 
for judges.”323 
The Supreme Court, in contrast to the “inferior courts,” is not subject 
to any disciplinary process, other than impeachment, and has no code of 
conduct to which it has bound itself.324 Chief Justice Roberts has 
explained that Justices on the Court do in fact consult the Code just as 
district and circuit court judges do,325 which is not the same as saying 
that they have bound themselves to follow the Code as lower courts 
have. Thus, for example, Justices Scalia and Thomas were featured 
speakers at the 2012 annual meeting of the Federalist Society, which 
would seem to have violated the Code of Conduct as construed by the 
Judicial Conference.326 The vacuum created by the absence of a Code to 
regulate the Court in the ethical dimension has been filled in the 
political dimension with a campaign launched by the media and interest 
groups, questioning the ethics and perceived impartiality of individual 
Justices, decrying the absence of a Code that applies to the Supreme 
Court, and calling for reform. At the same time, a group of preeminent 
scholars have called attention to the under-regulation of the Supreme 
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Court in the procedural and ethical dimensions and called for reform.327  
Among the states, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 
diminished the constitutional authority of state supreme courts and 
judicial conduct organizations to regulate the political speech of judges 
in the name of preserving judicial impartiality. Insofar as the ethical 
propriety of judges appearing to prejudge cases from the campaign 
stump remains an issue, it is an issue relegated by default to the political 
dimension.328 And so, in the post-White era, judicial campaigns have 
featured an awkward ballet, in which interest groups have asked judges 
to state their views on issues they may decide; and when judges demur, 
citing impartiality concerns, the groups have sought to make a campaign 
issue of the judges’ intransigence.329  
This trend in the regulation of impartiality that I have sought to 
isolate—away from its procedural and ethical dimensions and toward 
the political—yields a new perspective on longstanding, if diffuse, 
complaints within the legal establishment that the judiciary is being 
overly “politicized.” It is too late in the day to take calls to 
“depoliticize” the judiciary seriously, when social science learning and 
public opinion have converged on the conclusion that judges exercise 
discretion that is subject to ideological and other political influences.330 
In short, we must recognize that regulation of judges and their 
impartiality in the political dimension is an inevitability. One may 
nonetheless worry about excessive politicization, when pieces of 
impartiality that are arguably better reserved for regulation in the 
procedural and ethical dimensions are commandeered by the political 
dimension. For those who share such concerns, the three-dimensional 
schema proposed here offers a possible path to reform: regulatory 
recapture by the ethical or procedural dimensions from the political.  
One example should suffice. In the past decade, when Congress 
intruded upon the ethical dimension with threats to legislate against 
“junkets for judges,” insinuate an inspector general into the judiciary’s 
disciplinary process, and launch retaliatory impeachment inquiries, the 
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Judicial Conference responded by retaking the regulatory initiative. 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist established a Commission to evaluate 
the disciplinary process, which published a candid and sometimes 
critical self-assessment that culminated in proposed reforms that the 
Judicial Conference promptly adopted.331 At the same time, the Judicial 
Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct revised its advisory 
opinion on participation in and reimbursement for judicial participation 
in educational activities to address some of the core concerns 
underlying legislation aimed at so-called “junkets.”332 The gambit 
quieted congressional critics: no legislation was enacted, no formal 
impeachment investigations progressed, and the regulatory center of 
gravity remained within the ethical dimension and the Judicial Branch. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to develop a normative theory to 
evaluate which dimension is best suited to take the lead in regulating 
what impartiality problems. For purposes here, it is enough to note that 
the interdimensional balance is fluid and subject to negotiation and 
compromise.  
CONCLUSION 
Over the course of the past fifteen years, judicial independence has 
been richly theorized in symposia, books, and articles. This Article 
represents an initial effort to do the same for judicial impartiality. By 
reconceptualizing judicial impartiality in three dimensions, and 
applying this three-dimensional schema across a range of applications, I 
have sought to situate impartiality at a critical crossroads, where judicial 
procedure, ethics, and politics meet. 
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